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Marriage is an excellent estate planning,strategy Generally speaking 
one spouse can transfer assets to the other dunng life and at death witbout 
adverse estate or gift tax consequences.' This has two principal economic 
advantages. First the tax-free status of marital bansfe1.s allows a comparatively 
wealthy husband or wife to shift assets to his or her less wealthy spouse so that 
each may take maximum advantage of all available tax deducti:ns, exemptions, 
exclusions, special valuation rules, credits and lower tax Iates - Second the tax- 
free status of marital transfers allows a married couple to postpone the payment 
of estate tax until the death of the second s p o ~ s e . ~  For these reasons property 
transfers between spouses form the cornerstone ofthe vast majority of married 
couples' estate plans.' 
In permitting tax-free transfers during life and at death, the federal 
wealth transfer tax5 system treats a married couple as a single tax ayer Iust as 
marriage causes a man and woman to "become one flesh"'fo1 biblical - e 
purposes, it causes them to become one taxpayer for federal estate and gift tax 
1. See IRC $5 2056 (estate tax marital deduction) and 2523 (gift tax marital 
deduction). Unless otherwise specified all references to the Internal Revenue Code 
(hereinafter the "Code") refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. as amended 
Special rules limir the types of property interests eligible for rhc marit;il deduction See 
IKC $$2056(b)(l) Inodeduction disallowed where snousnl interest will rernlinate, i r r lu~  
. .. . . 
nlra,on lapse of time) and 2523(f) (in case of prope~t^y passing to spouse in trust, spouse 
must be entitled to all income from the property, payable at least annually) Note that 
the Code limits the marital deduction for transfers to a spouse who is not a United States 
citizen See IRC $$ 2056(d) (disallowance of estate tax marital deduction except for 
property in a passing in a qualified domestic trust) and 2523(i) (denying gift tax marital 
deduction for transfers to non-citizen spouse, but permitting annual exclusion gifts of 
- 
up to S100.000 to no']-citizen spouse). 
7 See discussion infra P;irt 11.A 2 .  
3 See discussion infra Part 1I.A. As the surviving spouse may use and even 
consume the first decedent's entire estate (including any amount that would have been 
used to nav estate taxes. if anv had been due unon the death of the first snouse to die). ~. , 
tlre surviving spouse benefits from the property during the survivor's lit'etlme, and the 
successor benrficinries eenernllv receive3 lower I;IX bill ontliecombinedestates or but11 
- 
spouses 
4. See Kathryn G Henkel. Estate Planning & Wealth Preservation: Strategies & 
Solutions -... TI 4 01.4 03 (2004): Jeffrey N Pennell, Estate Tax Marital Deduction 9 A-1 (BNA 
ZUOZ) 
5. As used herein. the phrase "wealth transfer taxation" refers to the estate and 
gift taxes. The same phrase often includes generation-skipping transfer taxes, as well, 
but these taxes are outside the scope of this article. For discussion of generation- 
skipping transfers, see, e.g , Jonathan G. Blattmachr, The Complete Guide to Wealth 
Preservation and Estate Planning 238-44 (1999). 
6. See, eg., Genesis 2:25 ("[A] man leaves his father and his mother and 
cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh."); Mark 10:7-10 ("'[A] man shall leave 
his father and mother and bejoined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh' So 
they are no longer two but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not 
man put asunder "). 
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purposes. The tax law embraces a "one flesh, one taxpayer" approach to marital 
wealth transfers.' 
The "one flesh, one taxpayer" rules are undesirable because they are 
based on gender stereotypes and because they deny estate and gift tax benefits 
to socially important non-marital relationships Legislative history cites 
economic unity as the rationale for the estate and gift tax marital deduction, but 
unmarried taxpayers who in fact are economically unified are ineligible for the 
deduction The one flesh, one taxpayer rules thus penalize those who do not 
want to marIy, but could marry (such as cohabitating hete~osexual partners),' 
those who want to marry, but cannot marry (such as some same-sex partners)' 
and those who do not want to marry and cannot in any case (such as elderly 
cohabitating siblings or an adult child who cares for an elderly parent)." 
Congress should eliminate the estate and gift t & ~  marital deduction and 
adopt a "one flesh, two taxpayer rule" for marital wealth  transfer^.^' Gratuitous 
transfers between spouses should be fully taxable," but each taxpayer should 
have a large credit against the tax, so that, in effect, the wealth transfer tax 
system will be inapplicable to the vast majority of taxpayers. By increasing the 
estate and gift tax unified credit to a sufficiently high number, such as I0 
million dollars, legislators can simplify the administration of the tax system 
and, somewhat counterintuitively, increase overall tax ~ e v e n u e . , ' ~  
Although the construction of husband and wife as a single economic 
unit seems ingrained in estate andgift taxjurisprudence,'~arried couples have 
not always enjoyed special tax status. Part I of this article traces the historic 
development of the "one flesh, one taxpayer" approach to wealth transfer 
taxation. In 1948 Congress used federal tax law to cure the economic impact of 
7 The phrase "marital wealth transfers" refers to transfers of property by one 
spouse to another during life or at death. 
8 See discussion infra Part El B 
9 See discussion infra Part m.B. 
10. See discussion infra Part D1.B 
1 I. But see generally Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP 
Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N C  L.. Rev. 1729, 1729 (1998) 
(suggesting that feminist legal scholarship on the estate and gift tax marital deduction 
has failed to "come up with aplausible solution" to gender bias in the Code); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Symposium: Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1521, 
1524 (1998) ("The most serious problem [with critical tax scholarship] is the failure to 
think tlrrough proposed solutions with sufficient care.") 
12. Even in the proposed one flesh, two taxpayer system, one spouse could 
make gifts to the other under the protection of the annual exclusion. See IRC 5 250.3(b). 
13. See discussion infra Parts IVB and C. The one flesh, two taxpayer rule 
does not contemplate any change to the tax rules applicable to charitable transfers See 
IRC $5  170(c), 2055(c) and 2522(a), 
14."[T]he 1948 statutory principle of equal taxes for equal income married 
couples has been 'almost universally accepted' by tax theorists." Boris I. Bittker, 
Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan L Rev 1389,1395 (1975) (citation 
omitted). Professor Lily Kahng suggests that the construction of husbands and wives as 
one person for tax purposes is "difficult to challenge because of its status as a first 
principle. Those who object to the harms inflicted on women by the fiction bear the 
burden of establishing that these harms are serious enough to require abandoning this 
fiction that masquerades as a first principle." Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in Taxing 
America 25.38 (Karen B Brown &Mary L.ouise Fellows eds , 1996) 
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differences in married couples' property rights under state law Over a period 
of more than thirty years, the maritai deduction then evolved f ~ o m  a tool for 
achieving jurisdictional uniformity" into an institution based on an unreal and 
idealized story of proper vender roles for men and women and the economic 
significance of marsiage '' 
Part D of this article details the benefits of marriage under present 
wealth transfer tax laws Apart from the estate and gift tax marital deduction," 
a married couple may "split" lifetime gifts to achieve a low (or no) tax bill., 
Unique among beneficiaries, a surviving spouse can disclaim propeIty to a trust 
for his or her own benefit without adverse tax consequences. 
Part Jll analyzes thejurisprudential implications of dle "one flesh, one 
taxpayer" approach to wealth transfer taxation Notwithstanding the law's 
gender neutrality, the current estate and gift tax approach to marriage is a 
vestige of the common law ~ n l e  of coverture that suspended a woman's legal 
identity during masriage.'8 Furthermore, in departure fromimportant tax policy 
goals, federal wealth transfer tax laws privilege heterosexual marital 
relationships over other socially important relationships with economic or 
emotional characteristics similar to marriage. By failing to ~ecognize the 
economic unity of taxpayers who may be opposite-sex unmarried domestic 
partners, same-sex domestic partners or adult children who support elderly 
parents, the one flesh, one taxpayer rule discourages relationships that benefit 
society as a whole. 
Part N proposes the elimination of the marital deduction in favor of a 
"one flesh, two taxpayer" approach to marriage that would cause all gratuitous 
transfers to be subject to taxation, regardless of the identity of the recipient. At 
the same time, the wealth transfer taxation system should accommodate a 
dramatically increased applicable exclusion amount. That way, even though all 
transfers will be subject to taxation, the vast majority of transfers will notresult 
in actual payment of tax.'' This Part illustrates how increasing the exemption 
amount will increase federal tax revenue and enhance the vitality of common 
law and community property systems The article concludes by connecting the 
estate and gift tax treatment of marriage to the larger issue of estate tax repeal 
and reform. 
15. See discussion infra Part I The marital deduction initially was limited to 
one-half of a decedent's adjusted gross estate tax and one-half of lifetime gifts See 
PenneII, supra note 4, at A-2 As part of the fax Reform Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94- 
455, 5 2002(a), 90 Stat 1520 (1976), Congress considered expanding the marital 
deduction to 100 % of a decedent's gross estate, but instead expanded the marital 
deduction to the greater of $250.000 or one-half of the adjusted gross estate See 
discussion infia Part ID.  As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub L. 
No. 97-34. 6 4031a). 95 Stat 172 (1981) (l~ereinafter "ERTA"). Coneress removed the 
pelcsnt:lgi limita'tibir or, [he m;rii;nl dcductron and ~adicirlly re12xZ th~ '  rules 011 the 
tvues of ~nousal DroDeltv 1nt;lcsts UYJI uu;ilifv to1 thc marital dcdocrion 
. . 
i6 ~eebis2.usGon infra part I E 
.
17 See supra text accompanying note 4 
18 See discussion infra in Part 111 A 
19 In effect, the applicableexclusiouamount is thecumulat~ve amount that any 
taxpayer may transfer tax-free during lifetime or at death See IRC 5 2010 
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I. Two SHALL BECOME ONE: 
THE HISTORY OF THE ESTATE AND GIE'T TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION 
A. Income Tax Corlseqrie~zces of Cornmci~zity P~operry and Co~~zmon L.aw 
Property Rules 
The current estate and gift tax treatment of intra-spousal transfers 
derives historically from related income tax rules Prior to 1948 joint income 
tax returns were unknown for the most part2o Each taxpayer filed a separate 
return, regardless of marital status." For that reason, married couples developed 
strategies designed to shift income from high-income spouse to the lower- 
income (or no-income) spouse in order to take advantage of exemptions 
available to each individual taxpayer. As an example, Guy C. Earl entered into 
an agreement with his wife pursuant to which each spouse agreed that any 
p~operty acquired by eitherof them, including salaries, would be treated as their 
joint property. For several years Mr. Easl, an attorney, earned legal fees 
Pursuant to their agreement, MI and Mrs. Earl each owned one-half of these 
fees. Mr. and Mrs. Earl each filed an individual income tax return reporting 
income for the relevant tax years in the amount of one-half of the legal fees 
earned by Mr. Earl that year." The Earls reasoned that because the property 
ownership was divided equally between them, their taxable income should be 
as well 
In 19.30 the United States Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers' 
argument in L~tcas v Earl: 
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those 
who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped 
by anticipatory~ar~angements and contracts however skillfully 
devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for 
a second in the man who earned it That seems to us the import 
of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be 
taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by 
which the fruits are attributed to a different hee from that on 
which they grew 'I 
2 0  See, e.g , Kahng, supra note 14, at 26-28. Prior legislation provided for 
limited joint filing by spouses. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women: How the 
MarriageTaxPenalty AffectsYourTaxes 30-31 (1997); MiujorieE Kornhauser, Love, 
Money and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 
Hastings L J  63 (1993); Angela V. Langlotz, Tying the Knot: The Tax Consequences 
of Maniage. 54 Tax Law 329,329 (2001). 
21. Kahng, supra note 14, at 26-28 
22. The applicable federal income tau statutes imposed a tax on "income 
derived from saliuies, wages, or compensation for personal services," among other 
items Revenue Act of 1918, Pub L. No. 254, 5 2I3(a), 40 Stat 1057, 1065 (1919); 
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub L. No 67-98, ch 136,4? Stat 227.238 (1921). 
23 Lucas v Earl, 281 US. 111, 114-115 (1930) 
The Court assumed, and the government did not contest, that for pmperty law 
purposes, the Earls'contract was valid." The Court acknowledged that spouses 
could fix property rights as between the two of them, causing property earned 
by one of them to be owned legally by both of them (thus dividing "fruit" from 
"tree"). But the Court held that such a contract had no impact for federal 
income tax purposes In other words, spouses could contract for property law 
results but not for tax results. Private property contracts could not change a tax 
system that precluded joint income tax returns. 
Appraximately eight months after the decision in Lircas v Earl, the 
Supreme Court held in Poe v Seabon~'~ that state property laws accomplished 
what private contracts did not - a change in the default federal income tax 
rules. The Poe Court held that for spouses residing in community property 
jurisdictions, federal income tax liability followed state law property 
ownership. In other words, because each spouse in a community property 
jurisdiction owned one-half of all property earned or held by the other," each 
spouse was taxable for federal income tax purposes on one-half of the 
comnunity income, regardless of which spouse earned the income. Thus if 
Spouse 1 earned a salary and Spouse 2 did not work outside the home, each 
spouse could file a federal income tax return and pay tax on one-half of Spouse 
1's salary. By using the exemptions allotted to each taxpayer, the two spouses 
together could shelter greater income from taxation than either one of them 
could alone. The income might even escape taxation entuely. 
The impact of state property law rules on federal income taxation can 
be illustrated by a simple example. Assume that Spouse 1 and Spouse 2 are 
married. Spouse 1 earns $100,000 per year for paid labor, but has no income 
from any other source Spouse 2 has no income at all. Assume further that the 
hypothetical tax system does not permitjoint filing, but exempts from taxation 
the first $20,000 of any individual's income. Any amounts over $20,000 are 
taxed at a rate of 50%. Disregarding the impact of other available exemptions 
or deductions, the combined federal income tax liability of Spouse 1 and 
Spouse 2 will depend on how applicable state property law treats the $100,000. 
Ifthe couple resides in acommon law,jurisdiction, Spouse 1 owns the $100,000 
and must report it on his or her individual income tax return.. Spouse 1's 
hypothetical tax liability will be $40,000 (50% of the amount by which 
$100,000 exceeds $20,000). Because Spouse 2 has no income, Spouse 2 will 
not file a tax return and owes no tax. Taken together, the couple's combined 
income tax liability is $40,000. 
In contrast, after the decision in Poe and before the creation of the joint 
return in 1948, if Spouse 1 and Spouse 2 resided in a community property 
jurisdiction, then regardless of who actually e m e d  the income, one-half of 
$100,000, or $50,000, was attributed to each spouse. Spouse 1 would have 
income tax liability of $15,000 (50% of the amount by which $50,000 exceeds 
$20,000). Spouse 2, who owned one-half of the community's income, also 
24 'The validity of the [Earlr'] contract is not questioned, and we assume it 
to be unquestionable under the law of the State of Califoinia, in which the parties lived " 
Earl 281 US. at 114 
25 282 U.S 101 (1930). 
26. William A Reppy, Jr. & Cynthia A Samuel, Community Property in the 
United States 1-1 1 (6th ed 2004) 
would have income tax liability of $15,000 (again, 50% of the amount by which 
$50,000 exceeds $20,000). Taken together, couple's combined income tax 
liability would be $30,000, or  $10,000 less than the common law couple's. 
The Poe decision confirmed that state community property law 
accomplished spousal income splitting without gift tax consequences. For that 
reason, community property 1,esident spouses efljoyed favoxable tax treatment 
compared with their common law counterparts- from 1930 until 1948, when 
Congress authorized income splitting by means of thejoint income tax return, 
B Ho~izo~ztn l  Eq~ril)! .Joi~zi 112co17ze Ta r  R e t r ~ ~ n r  a n d  the Wealth Tranrfer Tar  
Mal.itnl Deduction 
In 1948 Congress altered the income, estate and gift tax laws in 
response to the Poe court's exposure of the disparities in the federal tax 
treatment of married couples in common law and community pro4eIty 
jurisdictions '' In its report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1948,- the 
27. The communit roperty jurisdictions in 1948 were Arizona, California, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, a c h  an Nebraska, Nevada, New Mex~co, Oklahoma, 
Ore on, Texas, Washington anddsconsin. Pennsylvania'scnmmunity property statute 
had%eendeclared unconstitutional Today, thestates withcommuni property orquasi- 
community pro erty rules are Alaska, Arizona, California. Idaho,?kislana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, ?P exas, Washington and Wisconsin See S Rep No. 1013,,at 302 (1948). 
Most notably, Alaska permitsmarried residents and mamed non-residents to elect 
community pro erty treatment for some or all of thelr assets AlaskaStat §?i 3477,010 - 
995 (Michie 2093). In order to create Alaska community property, amzuned cpu le not 
resident in Alaska must transfer assets to a Uust meetlno certzun requxements, lnceuding 
that one of the Trustees must be an individual who is domiciled in Alaska, or a bank or 
trust corn any or-anized under Alaska law and having its principal lace of business in P Alaska. llaska &at 5 34 77.100(a). For general discussion o Alaska's, elective 
community roperty law, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr et a l ,  Tax Plannin With 
Consensual gommunity Pro erty, 33 Real Pro Prob. & Tr I. 615 (1999f Alan 
Newman, Inco orating the $artnership Theor 8f Marriage Into Elective-Share Law, 
49 Emory L 1. $7 (2000); David G. shaftel &2ephenGreer, Ohtarnin aFull Step ed 
Up Basis Under Alaska's New Commun~ty Property System, 2.3 Est. Pfan. 109 (1899); 
http://www alaskatiust com/www/homepgl?.html (last visited July 28,2004) 
28 S .  Rep. No. 80-1013, at 1 ("Equalization is provided for the tax,burdens of 
married couples in common-law and community-propert States The b~ l l  corrects 
existin. inequalities under the estate and gift taxes, as we6 as the individual income 
tax") 80th in 1948 and now, in states such as Califomia, each spouse legally owns one- 
half of the community property, regardless of the form in whch the property is held., 
State law accomplishes this division of property w~thout any adverse tax consequences., 
See Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 236-237 (8th ed. 2000); 
Carolyn C Jones, Split Income and Se mate S heres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 
1940s, 6 Law & Hist. Rev 259,266,273-74; Zahng, supra note 14, at 28; Pennell supra 
note 4. at A-2. 
Furthermore, in community propert jurisdictionstat death, the first spouse to 
die may dis ose of only his or her share o r  the commumty property, Only the first, 
decedent's siare of the community property is subject to estate t a ,  w~ th  the other half 
esca in taxation until the second decedent's death See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U S. 101, 
11 1 fl980) ("[Qt is clear that income ofcommunity roperty is owned by the commumty 
and that husband and wife have each apresent vestegone-half interest therein" ); Blrtker 
et a1 at 237; Reppy & Samuel, supra note 26, at 13-21 
Post-Poe, state pro eny rules had important consequences for not only income 
taxes, but for wealth trans$[ taxes as well. Assume for example that Spouse 1 and 
Spouse 2 resided in a common law ju~isdiction prior to 1948, and that Spouse I died 
w~th a gross estate of $100.000 passing entirely to Spouse 2 Assuming a 50% rate of 
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Senate Finance Committee acknowledged the likelihood that several states 
would convert to community propeIty systems so that their citizens would 
expe~ience no financial disadvantage: 
[Tlhe fact which makes action at the present session 
imperative is the potential rapid extension of community 
is one-half of the tax impdsed if Spouse 1 had resided in a c o b o n  law j'urisdiction 
($50.0001 
Compare'as follows: 
r I Common Law Jurisdiction II Communitv Prooertv I 
To achieve a $50.000 moss estate. common law resident Snouse I would have 
i:teded ro consunle 01 €ive n\Gy a p o ~ t ~ o n  f the '$100,000 to sptuse 2 01 ro orhers 
f'rio~ ro the insrirurion otr11e nlariral dcciucrion. an\' Ilferlrn~ eiits bv SDOUSL. I \vould be 
subject to gift tax. If the gift tau rate were, say, <o%, co&on law residing Spouse 1 
with assets $100,000 could make a taxable gift of $33,333. Spouse 1 then would pay a 
gift tau of $16,667 (rounded) (50% of $33,333). Spouse 1 would then have a remaining 
gross estate of $50,000 ($100,000 minus $31,333 minus $16,667) and estate tax bill of 
$25,000 (50% of the remaining floss estate). Spouse 2 would have total assets of 
$58,333 ($33,333 received during Spouse 1's lifetime plus $50,000 upon Spouse 1's 
death) Note that community property resident Spouse 1 did not have to make any 
lifetime taxable tsansfers to achieve the gross estate of $50,000; state law effected 
Spouse 2's ownership of $50,000. At death, Spouse 1 would transfer $50,000 net to 
Spouse 2. Spouse 2 would have total assets of $75,000. Compare as follows: 
I I Common Law Jurisdiction 11 Community Property 1 
29 Pub L .  No 80-471, 62 Stat 110, reprinted in 1948-1 C . B  211 
Estate taxes (50%) 
Net estate 
Bequest to Spouse 2 
Net assets 
(25.000) 
25,000 
(25,000) 
0 
25,000 
$58,333 
(25,000) 0 
--
25,000 50,000 
(25,000) 25,000 
0 $75,000 
property to a large number of common-law States. The 
adoption of community property has been advocated widely in 
spite of a growing awareness of the substantial differences 
between community property and common law which make a 
transition to one system extremely difficult . . . . [Tlhere is a 
lively fear that the tax advantages of community property will 
produce a migration of the relatively well-to-do taxpayers 
[from common law states] . . . If the necessary action is not 
taken, there will be a flood of State legislation . . which has 
the most unfortunate consequences, not only for the taxpayers 
involved, but also for the pelsons who must use or administer 
the property laws of the States which rush into the community- 
property system." 
The Finance Committee predicted a "difficult transition" as common 
law states moved to community property3' and created mass confusion and 
administrative nightmares. Even if the potential wave of state property law 
change and confusion was not strictly a federal problem, Congress addressed 
it with a federal solution. As legislators flamed the issue, if similarly situated 
spouses were taxed differently because of differences in state property law, 
federal tax law, not state law, should change. In the Congressional view, 
geographic differences meant that federal tax law failed to achieve its important 
policy goal of horizontal equity, the principle that "people with about the same 
income should pay about the same tax.'"= Geog~.aphic equalization then became 
the rallying cry behind the enactment of the joint income tax return in 1948.33 
In addition to the joint income tax return, Congess saw gift-splittin 
and the estate and gift tax marital deduction as primary equalizing vehicles. 8 
With the enactment of LRC $251.3;' spouses could agree to have any transfer 
made by either of them heated as made one-half by each spouse. The marital 
deduction itselfinitially was limited to one-half of a decedent's gross estate or 
one-half of any lifetime transfer by gift?6 This new tax rule achieved for 
common law resident spouses the same tax treatment of gifts made by 
community property resident spouses With the deduction, a common law 
resident spouse could transfer all property to his or he1 spouse at death, but owe 
estate tax only on half of the estate (as one-half did not qualify for the marital 
30 S. Rep No 101.3, at 302-03. 
31 Id at 302. 
32. Daniel Q Posin&DonaldB. Tohin, Principlesof Federal Income Taxation 
26 (6th e d  2003). See generally Walter J Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr,, The Uneasy Case 
for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. L.  Rev. 417 (1952); Walter 3. Blum, Revisiting the 
Uneasv Case for Prornessive Taxation. 60 Taxes 16 (1982) 
' 33 S Rep Go. 101 3,ar 302 ~niforrnil~ is;l~onsri~urio1~;111c~ui~erncnr. "(A]11 
duties, iln~osts. andexciscd \I1311 be uiiiforin th~ouehout hc ll~lircd Slates " 11 S Consr 
. . - 
art. I, $ 8, cl. 2,  
34 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L,. 80-471, 5 372, 62 Stat. 110, 125-27, 
reprinted in 1948-1 C.B 211, 223-24; S. Rep. No. 1013, at 303-06 For further 
discussion ofthe history of the wealth transfer tax marital deduction, see, e.g, Richard 
B. Stephens et al., Federal Estate & Gift Taxation 1506[1] (8th ed 2002) 
35 IRC $2513 (1948). 
36. E g  , Bittker et al., supra note 28, at 337-38, 
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deduction) For. most practical purposes, then, the new rules achieved the 
desired geographic parity between common law and community property 
resident spouses." 
Under the estate and gift tax laws enacted in 1948, a limited category 
of transfers apart from outright gifts and bequests qualified for the marital 
deduction. The new laws generally prohibited deductions for terminable 
interests,"' or interests subject to the spouse's divestiture, although the law 
allowed a deduction for a spouse's income interest in a trust over which the 
spouse had a specific type of general power of appointment.39 In recognizing 
this limited exception to the terminable interest rule, Congress treated a life 
estate coupled with a general power as equivalent for transfer tax purposes to 
outiight ownership even though the spouse lacked full ownership rights over 
the property.""The constmction of substantively different property interests as 
equivalent for tax purposes played an important role in the estate and gift tax 
marital deduction froin its inception. This equivalency theme recurred 
prominently in later Congressional debates over the marital deduction., 
Contemporary commentators reactedunfavurably to the level of control 
by a surviving spouse that was required to qualify transfers for the marital 
deduction?' Outright ownership or  a general power of appointment enabled a 
widow to "cut off the objects of [the husband's] bounty and leave his estate to 
a gigolo second husband,"" or "cut off" a husband's intended beneficiaries 'by 
the stroke of a mother's pen Even if husbands and wives were theoretical 
economic partners, that partnership lasted only as long as they (or their 
marriage) did. Truly equal spousal ownership of property was problematic 
because women were too weak (and thus prey for "a gigolo second husband") 
37 Precise geographic equalization remained somewhat elusive, for technical 
reasons relating mostly to the taw treatment of spousal joint tenancies See, e g , S Rep 
No. 1013. at 304 (in its [wort. the Senate Finance Committee noted that "the 
widesprc;~d useotitic'tenancis~ tncommon-law States" presentedpalricula~ ch2liengr.s) 
Fut a dc t i~ t l~~ i  Oiscu~~iun 01 l l~r  li~x tt?a[tnent of ioir~t trnancics, \el: Steuhcns ct :!I . 
supra note 34,15.06[3][d]. 
3 8  Pub L.. No. 591-736, 5 2056,68A Stat 1, at A318 (1948) For a general 
explanation of'the relaxed terminable interest rule, see S. Rep No 1013, at 335-36; S 
Rep. 1622, at 125 (1948). 
39 In a broad sense, a general power of appointment is "[o]ne exercisable in 
favor of any person the donee may select " Black's Law Dictionary 685 (6th ed 1990) 
For federal estate and eift tax oumoses. however. in order for a trust to oualifv for the 
marital deduction und; IRC $2656(b)(5), the spouse must have the t<appoint 
all or a specific portion of the trust property in favor of the surviving spouse or his or 
her estate, whether or not the power is exercisable in favor of others, and with no power 
in any orher pelson tu ~ppoint any pair of tile uusl to any persor~ orher than [lie suivivirig 
spouse IRC $ 2056(b,(j) C!' 1KC 3 70-11 (gene121 pouer of appointment is a potrsr 
cncrci\;thie i n  f;~vor oithc til~~nyer himself, l~c~sclf,  his or Itet es[:rte d11d tlrc ~reditvrs 
of his or her estate, except in ceitain circumstances) 
40 In 1954, the maital deduction rules were relaxed to permit explicitly a life 
estate to qualify for the marital deduction. See H R  Rep. No 1337, at 91-92 (1954) 
41. Kahng, supra note 14, at 33-35 
42. Charles Looker, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes on Property 
Disposition, 38 Cal. L. Rev. 44, 62 (1950) 
43. Id. at 67 
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or too strong (capricious evil-doers who cut otf beneficiaries with a "stroke of 
a mother's pen") 
C Trillmnph of S~lbrtn~zce Ovel Fomnz 
In 1966, almost twenty years after the enactment of the provisions 
authorizing the joint income tax return and the estate and gift tax marital 
deduction, Congress amended the marital deduction provisions to address 
perceived "inequities and disc~imination"~" in the transfer tax treatment of 
disclaimed property. In particular, legislators saw economic discrimination in 
the non-recognition for' transfer tax pnrposes of disclaimers by persons other 
than a surviving spouse.?5 To illustrate, if an unrelated third party disclaimed 
a testamentary bequest, even if the disclaimedproperty passed to the decedent's 
surviving s ouse, the transfer would not qualify for the estate tax marital l' deduction.' In the case of disclaimed property, tax results depended on the 
process by which a surviving spouse received proper.ty, not its receipt alone, 
Thus for transfer tax purposes prior to 1966, form vanquished substance 
Echoing Conness's 1948 dismay at the "unfortunate" conversion of 
- 
conlrnon law jurisdici;ons to c o i n m u ~ ~ i r ~ ~ ~ o ~ c i ~ ~  systcms." thc House Ways 
and hleans Cornmirtcc labslctl thc pie- 1966 disclain~er iules 2s "unloitunate"':R 
for causing estate tax consequences to deviate from underlying substantive 
property ownership. In most of these "unfortunate" disclaimer cases, the 
Committee observed, "the failure to make provision for the ma~ital deduction 
stemmed from an absence of knowledge concerning estate tax law by the 
decedent."'"'This is an area of the law which, of necessity, contains 
complexities and frequently is not understood by an individual preparing his 
own will."so In the face of complex and confusing laws, Congress believed that 
taxpayers should be saved from their own mistaltes, and that wealth transfer 
taxation rules should be flexible where possible in granting the marital 
deduction. 
In 1966 Congress ratified revised disclaimer rules. Under the new 
transfer tax rules, whether a surviving spouse received property became more 
important than how he or she received it. In other words, a bequest directly to 
a surviving spouse was equivalent for tax purposes to an indirect transfer to the 
surviving spouse via disclaimer. In either case, the surviving spouse became 
entitled to the property. Congress again showed preference for tax rules that 
tracked economic or beneficial ownership of property." 
44 S. Rep No. 1599, at 1-6 (1966) 
45 mc 5 2056(d) 
46 Id 
47 See supra note 30 and accompanying 
48 H R Rep No 1513, at 2-7 (1966) 
49 Id 
50 Id 
51 In stating its rationale for suppoiting the legislative change, the Senate 
Finance Committee employed language substantially similar to the House Ways and 
Means Committee's: 
to see why 'a ]kg& tax should 6e recovered-frbm the estate than 
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D Tlze Iizcipierzt Orze Flesh, One Tn~ppclyer Tlzeoryof Wealth T~aizsfer Ta.xatiorz 
The next significant development in the history of'the estate and gift 
tax treatment of marital transfers occurred in 1976. The Tax Reform Act of 
1976 ("1976 TRA")" is landmark legislation best known for substantially 
unifying the estate and gift tax systems.53 Less well known is that the 1976 
TRA implemented (albeit temporarily and ineffectively) the nation's first 
generation-skipping transfer t&x."' Furthermore, in connection with the 1976 
TRA's increase of the marital deduction to the greater of $250,000 or one-half 
of a decedent's adjusted gross estate,55 Congress considered, but did not pass, 
an increase in the marital deduction to 100% of a decedent's estate for transfers 
at death, regardless of estate size, and the entire value of property for transfers 
by lifetime gift.56 
would be true where the property goes directly to the surviving 
spouse (rather than indirectly as a result of a disclaimer). In both 
cases the economic effect of the transaction is the same. ivloreover, 
frequently the failure to malce provision for the marital deduction in 
the first instance stems from an absence of knowledge concerning 
estate tax law by the decedent. This is an area of the law which, of 
necessitv. contains cnmolexities and freauentlv is not fullv 
understiod by an individuhl preparing his ow; wily 
S Reo No 1599. at 1-6 (1966) 
52 Fax Reform Act of 1976 Pub L 94-455, 90 Stat 1520 (1976) For 
discussion of the impact on estate planning by the 1976 TRA's important changes to the 
federal tax system, see, e g., Jonathan G Blattmachr & Thomas J McGrath, Carryover 
Basis UnderThe 1976Tax ReformAct(1977); Joseph M Dodge, Generation-Skipping 
Transfers After The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 125 U Pa L Rev 1265 (1977) 
53 As Ronald D Aucutt explains, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 partially 
'unified' the gift and estate taxes 
by making the estate tax cumulative with the gift tax through the 
concepts of 'adjusted taxable gifts' and a 'unified credit.' with the 
- 
s:llne sr:ttcd inrcs. l ' l~c  Acr rcp?alcd [he former spcciric sxi.mptions 
of 530,UOO i i ~ r  ei i t  tax putposes 2nd 560,000 iur estarc tnx purpose$ 
I<on:ild U Aucutt. Thc Stxutc of Ltnirtniions 311d L)i~cIosure Rules 
for Gifts, SJ073 ALI-ABA 1345, 1348 (citations omitted) 
For further discussion of the unification of the wealth transfer tax system, see, e g , Paul 
R McDaaicl et al , Federal Wealth Transfer Taxation 8-9 (5th ed 2003) 
54 Ageneration-skipping transfer occurs when, for example, a taxpayer makes 
a gift to a trust for the benefit of his or her child, with remainder to the grantor's 
grandchild See IRC $5 2515, 2602-2603,2611-2613,2621-2623,2631,2641-2642, 
2651-2653; Treas. Reg §§ 262601-l(a), (b), 26 2611-12, 26 2612-1, 262613-1, 
26 2642-2(a)(1), (2), 26 2652(a)(I)-(4). 
The provisions of the 1976 TRA relaling to the generation-skipping transfer 
tax were repealed retroactively in 1986 and a new generation-skipping transfer tax 
system was enacted See Stephanie 1. Willbanks, Federal Taxation of Wealth Transfers 
6 (2004) For a superb analysis of the generation-skipping transfer tax, see Carol A. 
Harrington et al , Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (2d ed. 2001). 
55. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L 94-455,s 2002(a), 90 Stat 1520 (1976) 
See generally Pennell, supra note 4, at A-3 
56 See generally Pennell, supra note 4, at A-3 
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Although lawmakers ultimately did not a g e e  in 1976 to increase the 
marital deduction to the full value of the decedent's gross estate,s7 in 
considering the possibility Congress laid the foundation forthe "one flesh, one 
taxpayer" approach to marriage and wealth tsansfer taxation 58 Close analysis 
of the legislative history and supporting materials, including the Studies and 
Proposals of the Treasury Department, the House and Senate Committee 
Reports and testimony before Congressional Committees, ~eveals  a shift in 
policy focus Congress moved away from the horizontal equity5%oncerns of 
1948 toward a new goal of vertical equity in taxation.60 Specifically, lawmakers 
focused on the supposed ability of wealthy couples to avoid estate tax entirely 
(albeit through lifetime taxable gifts) and the expansion of this "right" to 
married couples of all levels of wealth6' 
In arguing for an increased estate and gift tax marital deduction, the 
bill's supporteIs construed marriage as a unique economic partnership that 
deserved special tax treatment Four particular themes emerge from the 
legislative history F i~s t ,  according to Congress, husbands and wives treat all 
assets belonging to either of them as belonging to both of them. 
[Mlany families regard their property as being generated by 
their combined efforts and, thus, "ours" rather than "his" and 
"he~s" [TJhey often transfer property from separate 
ownership to joint ownership or community property without 
paying much attention to the legal change in ownership There 
is a serious question whether it is appropriate to tax such 
57 Congress did increase the estate tax mxital deduction from one-half of the 
- (Iccedent's 3djust~II gross es t~ tc  to the grcxt?i oi (I)  S?10,000 oi (11, one liali oi tlic 
deccdeni's adlusrecl zrosi cst3re The tn[:re;~sed eitr 13'; mat tr:il deducttori u.ai unliriiited 
with respect <o the f h t  $100,000 and 50% of 18etime tiansfcrs in excess of $200,000 
Pub L 97-34, 9 339,95 Stat 172 (1981) 
58 S L , ~  supr;~ norc 6 3nJ accornpnriyirig test 
59 In ih i i  conrexi, horizunt:~l ccluity tsl'ers lo the tdc:i that ,111 rnixricd ;ouvI:s. 
regardless of their state of residence, should be subject to the same level of wealth 
transfer taxation For further discussion of the role of horizontal equity in taxation, see 
eenerallv Michael A Livineston. Taxation Law. Planning & Policv xxv-xxxvi (2003) 
Scc alst;thristopliei '1. Yi.xori. Should ~ o n ~ r c ; ,  ~e\isil'tlrL. T J S ~ O J ~  10  ,xreiid thc 
S;tme T;rx Benefits to Sarne-Sex Cuur~lcz as are C:rirrsritl\ Cji;inted to llarric,l Cuu~les'! 
An Analysis in Light of I-forizontal ~ ~ u i t ~ ,  23 S Ill U .L 1 41 (1998) (cornparin;: tax 
treatment of same-sex couoles to tax treatment of oooosite-sex married coooles) 
. . 
60 Hetc veir:c:il equity tefet; to the idc:i that 311 rn;iiticd couples, regardless 
of rhei~ level 01 n.c;tlth, slioitld bc subiect tu ~ I I L .  zanie 1cvr.l of we;ilth trnnsicr t3n:ition 
For further discussion of the role of veitical equity in taxation, see generally Livingston, 
supra note 59; Philip D Oliver, Tax Policy 1-4 (2d ed. 2004) 
61 In the Tax Reform Studies and Proposals published jointly by the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, the Treasury 
Dcp;il trnsnr c.xplainc.1 t11:ii \<~,althy mi1rrii.d 13xp;<!crs lyprc:iliy r.xplotted loiiei gift tau 
r:ites to iii;il;e liie~tnic initc.;~d oide:irli rime tisr~sf:is to tile its\ \\c:iltiiy spotlie loin1 
Comin on T:i\ Ref. T.rx R.-iaim S I I I ~ I C S  arid Pi~rpusals 257-?iL) 119691 
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transfers that are basically just incidents in the common 
management of the family's pooled resources 
Congress viewed the legal form of marital property ownership as less 
important than how spouses themselves approach the property, 
In support of the assertion that most married couples treat property 
owned by either of them as "'ours' from the time of its acquisition since it was 
acquired with family funds,"63 lawmakers in 1976 entertained little direct 
testimony about taxpayers' attitudes toward marital property Sociologists now 
would suggest that Congress was mistaken in its assertions Historically 
husbands have controlled marital finances? and even today in a couple where 
both spouses frequently engage in paid labor, a wife frequently regards her 
earnings as "for personal frills" and husbands "are still more likely than their 
wives to retain personal spending money "65 
The second theme that emerges fromthe 1976 legislative history is that 
economic dependents deserve special insulation from the negative impact of the 
estate tax. Statistically speaking, in 1976 the majority of adult taxpayers were 
married.66 Most married women did not work outside the home6 and the 
average family had moIe than one minor child These data help explain the 
T ~ e a s u ~ y  Department's emphasis on the "especially difficult burden [that] may 
be imposed by the [estate] tax when property passes to a widow, particularly if 
there are minor ~ h i l d r e n . " ~ ~  Through images of bereft widows and orphans, 
advocates appealed for legislative sympathy for those who were unable to 
provide financially for themselves., 
A third theme of the 1976 legislative histo~y is that taxation of wealth 
transfe~s hould be postponed until the death of the second spouse "It does not 
appear . . . that transfers between husband and wife are appropriate occasions 
for imposing tax," asserted the Treasury Department.'"'"T]I~e [full marital 
62 Tax Reform (Administration and Public Witnesses): Public Hearings 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess Part 2,1187 (Mar 
22. 1976) (testimonv of Treasurv Secretarv William E Simon). For an analvsis of the 
. . 
p~;rriership aPI)io.~&. s x  i \ l i l r jd l i~ '  I: t i~, ;nl~ai~s~i .  l) 'cons[ruCrin~ the ~.~u;hle linit: 
Int~ahousshold Alloc~tions and the Dilernm:! of the loint Rcruin. 16 N Y L S L . ~  J 
Hum Rts 140 (1999) I<ornhauser asks, "If marriage is a why do only 10% 
of married women use a name other than their husband's?" Id at 150. 
63. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, supra note 61, at 258 
64. Viviana A Z,elizer, The Social Meaning ofMoney: Pin Money, Paychecks 
and Other Currency 43-66 (1994) 
65. Id at 68-69. 
66  Arlene F Saiuter Sr Terry A Lugaila, Current Population Reports, 
Population Characteristics P20-496 (Mar 98),  available a t  
http://www.census gov/prod/3/98pubs/p20-496 pdf. 
6 7  Howard N Fullerton, Jr, Labor Force Participation: 75 Yews of Change, 
1950-98 and 1998-2025. 122 Monthlv Lab Rev 3 (1999). available at 
http://www bis gov/opub/mir/1999/12/artlf~ll pdf. 
68. Average Population Per Household and Family: 1940 to Present, U.S 
Bureau of the Census, at http://www census gov/population/socdemoihh-fdtabHH- 
6x1s (last modified June 11, 2003) 
69 Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, supra note 61, at 258 
70 Id at 199 
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deduction] proposal is designed to provide that property of a married couple 
will be taxed once as it passes to the next generation"" Note that the proposed 
tax law did not contemplate an exemption for wealth transfers between 
unmarried members of the same generation (although generational differences 
between tapayeis formed the backbone of the ill-fated generation-skipping 
transfer tax provisions of 1976) "The proposed full deduction applied only to 
transfers between spouses, regardless ofany age difference between them. Thus 
the marital unit itself took on greater importance than the characteristics of 
either member of the couple 
This focus on the marital unit itself gsew out the joint income tax 
return If married couples filed one return for income tax purposes, the logical 
extension of that argument was that they should, in effect, file one estate tax 
return (or at least pay only one estate tax) Even if a full martial deduction 
meant lost federal revenue, advocates insisted that it would facilitate smooth 
administ~ation of the wealth transfer tax system13 
Building on the notion of a merged husband and wife taxpayer, the 
fourth theme from the debate over the marital deduction is the relationship 
among substance, form and tax results. Specifically, Congress considered 
revising the terminable interest rule to ~ rov ide  that a mere life estate in a 
- 
su~viving spousr. \rithout ;t genela1 pu\\.er 01 appointment qunl~fied fol the 
m;lrir;ll dctluciioil Tuinirica blind evc to i l~c  lirnirerl righrs of a liir bencfic.i;~rv, 
the Treasury Department-asserted &at "whether thehusband or wife makes 
provision as to who gets the property ultimately" was insignificant to the 
federal government "so long as it is agreed that the property will be taxed on 
the death of the spouse"74 Limiting the federal interest in this way accorded 
generally with the previously articulated viewpoint that a married couple, not 
an individual taxpayer, was the appropriate taxable unit for estate and gift tax 
- .  -. * - 
purposes. 
Yet the claim that the federal interest was limited to the eventual 
taxation of property masked an entirely different agenda Specifically the estate 
and gift tax rules forced men to ~elinquish too much control over their property 
in order to qualify their transfers for the martial deduction." 
Under present law, the bequest [of a terminable interest] only 
qualifies for the marital deduction if the spouse has control 
over the property underlying her income interest that is 
considered her property (and taxable at her death). A husband 
may want to leave the income from his property to his wife but 
ensure that the property goes on her death to his children. 
O~dinarily . . . the bequest would not qualify under present law 
for the marital d e d ~ c t i o n ' ~  
71 Id at 260 
72 See supra note 54 and accompanying text 
73 Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, supra note 61, at 260 
711 Trf , . A*., 
75 With respect to the legislative history of ERTA, Kahng, supra note 14, at 
32.34, makes a similar point Kahng does not address the legislative history of the 1976 
TRA, however. 
76 Tax Reform Studies and Pioposals, supra note 61, at 259. 
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In a certain sense, the two arguments in favor of a naked life estate's 
qualification for the marital deduction contradicted each other. If husband and 
wife had identical or subsrantially identical economic interests, they arguably 
deserved recognition as one person for transfer t&x purposes. The male half of 
the taxable "person" (and the legislative history indeed contemplates a male 
taxpayer77) would require no control over the ultimate disposition of the 
property, if the female half of the taxable "person" exercised her general power 
of appointment on her subsequent death in a manner consistent with the male's 
intentions. The real concern behind the strict qualifications for marital property, 
however, was that husband and wife were not economic alter egos of each 
other. At a time when the national divorce rate was 5 0 per 1,000 total 
population,78 spouses frequently had divergent dispositive inte~ests. 
E Vertical Equiry and the Ftrll Mar-itnl Dedtrctiorz 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198 1 ("ERTA)" finally codified 
the one flesh, one taxpayer approach to marital wealth transfers that had been 
developing since 1948 ERTA made two substantial refinements to the marital 
deduction First lawmakers increased the marital deduction so that a decedent's 
entire estate and the full value of any lifetime denotive hansfer could qualify 
for the marital deduction Second the prohibition on terminable interests was 
relaxed, so that the fixst spouse to die could retain substantial control over a 
trust for the surviving spouse's benefit, without sacrificing eligibility for the 
- .  - .  
marital deduction. 
Thesuccessful arguments madein 1951 in favorof anunlimitedmarital 
deduction resounded the themes of 1976. In language borrowed directlv from 
the legislative history of the 1976 TRA, the AeaYsury Department dpined: 
"Many couples view their property as 'ours' rather than 'his' or 'hers,' 
especially if the property is purchased with 'fanlily' funds The House Ways 
andMeans Committee also claimed that economic dependents deserved special 
insulation from the negative impact of the estate tax. In an appeal to legislative 
sympathy, the Committee report called the estate tax the "widow's tax," 
because it "falls most heavily on widows," an echo of the sentiments of 1976." 
The Senate Finance Committee emphasized the proper time for imposition of 
77 Id. 
78 Table 2-1, Estimated Number of Divorces and Annulments and Rates, With 
Percent Changes From Preceding Year.; United States 1920-1976, Vital Statistics of the 
United States 1976, Vol. I11 - Marriage and Divorce, available at 
http://www cdc.govlnchs/datalvsus/mgdv76~3.pdf(June 10,2004). In 1976, the late of 
marriage was 10 per 1,000 population. Id at Table 1-1. In 2001, the divorce rate was 
4.0 per 1,000 total population; the marriage rate was 8.4 per 1,000 total population. 
Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2001, National Vital 
S t a t i s t i c s  R e p o r t  ( S e p t .  1 1 ,  2 0 0 2 ) .  a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www cdc gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsdO/nvsr50~14.pdf. 
79 Economic Recovery Tax Act of' 1954, Pub L No 97 - 14, as stat I72 
(1981) 
80 Treasury Department's General and Technical Explanation of H.R. 3849: 
Administration's E,conomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 97th Cong , 1st Sess , at 39 
(.June 23, 1981) 
81 See supra note 69 and accompanying text, 
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the estate tax as well as the complex relationship among substance, f o m ~  and 
tax result " 
Congress intended the increased marital deduction to implement the 
vision of "husband and wife as a single economic unit for transfer tax purposes, 
as they are generally treated for income tax purposes"" Advocates of tax 
reform emphasized the urgent need f o ~  simplification of the marital deduction, 
citing overwhelming difficulty in determining ownership of marital property," 
and "the pressure to engage in complex estate pianning Yet in adopting 
relaxed terminable interest rules in connection with the full marital deduction, 
Congess in fact complicated tax administration and estate planning.8" 
The enactment of the qualified terminable interest rules of section 
2056(b)(7)" represented the ultimate triumph of form over substance By 
allowing sharply circumscribed property interests, such as an income interest 
in a tsust without any power of appointment, to qualify for the marital 
deduction, federal tax jurisprudence turned full circle from its 1948 position 
that the substance of state law comnlunity property rights should control federal 
tax results. Congress permitted a decedent's estate to take a deduction for the 
full value of property passing to a trust for the benefit of a surviving spouse, 
even though the actuarial value of the spouse's interest, depending on the 
spouse's age and other factors, could be far less than the value of the entire 
property With ERTA, lawmake~s reasoned that a mere income interest was 
equivalent, for transfer tax purposes, to outsight owne~ship.'~ This equivalency 
argument was cr.ucia1 to preserving the (typically male) testator's ultimate 
contsol over property 90 
ERTA's adoption of the modified qualified terminable interest 
("QTIP") rules in 1981 exposes the ultimate hollowness of the one flesh, one 
taxpayer approach to marital wealth transfers. Under the p~e-1981 marital 
deduction mles, only outright ownership or a life estate coupled with a general 
power could qualify for the marital deduction. The law required a taxpayer who 
sought to qualify a transfer for a full estate tax marital deduction to choose 
"between surrendering control of the entire estate to avoid imposition of the 
estate tax at his death or reducing his tax benefit at his death to insure 
inheritance by the children."" Congessional recognition of this "difficult"" 
choice amounted to an acknowledgment that the construction ofhusbands and 
wives as one taxpayer was legal f i~t ion,"~ or at least inconsistent with human 
82 See S Rep No 97-144, at 127 (1981), 
83 Id, 
84 Id ; H R Rep No 97-201, at 158 (1981) 
85 Treasury Department's General and Technical Explanation, supra note 80, 
at 39 
86. Several scholars aptly critique the contribution of the QTIP provisions to 
a simplified tax system. See, e.g , Wendy C. Gerzog, The Mluital Deduction QTIP 
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA Women's J 1. 301 (1995), 
87. IRC 5 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(I) 
88 See id 
89 Compare H.R. Rep No 1337, at 91-92 
90 Sec generally Kahng, supra note 14 
91 H.R Rep No 97-201, at 160 
92 127 Cong Rec S:8346 (daily ed July 24, 1981) (remarks of Sen Boien). 
93 See generally Kahng, supra note 14 
nature The surviving spouse could not be relied upon to serve as a dispositive 
extension of the first spouse to die, either because the spouses had different 
objects of their bounty or because the survivor's needs and wishes changed 
over his or her ongoing life. Yet instead of honoring the principle that tax 
results should follow from substantive property ownership, Congress indulged 
anxieties about a transferor-spouse's loss of control by changing the tax law. 
Tangled in the construction of husbands and wives'as one economic 
unit, in 1981 Congress enacted the QTIP rules to permit the first spouse to die 
to control the disposition of the transferred property upon the surviving 
spouse's subsequent death Husbands and wives might be one taxpayer, when 
convenient, but the construction strained in the face of a surviving spouse's 
potential outright owne~ship of all marital property9" 
11. CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF MARITAL WEALTH TRANSFERS 
A The U~zlmzited 12/01 rtnl Dedrrction, or "What's il.Irne I s  YOUIS" 
Since the enactment of ERTAin 1981, a married person generally may 
transfer an unlimited amount of prope~ty to his or her spouse without triggering 
the imposition of an estate or gift tax?' provided that the property is in a 
qualified formg6 The favorable wealtl~ transfer tax treatment of transfers 
94. In 1980, approximately 147,000 estate tax returns were filed Internal 
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Winter 2003-2004 Bulletin, Table 22, Selected 
Returns and Forms Filed or To Be Filed By Type During Specified Calendar Years 
1975-2004 (May, 20041, available at http://www.i1s.g0v/pub1irs-soi/04al22sr.xls (last 
visited Aug 9, 2004) The federal government collected an estimated $6,282,247 in 
estate taxes for that year. Internal Revenue Service Data Book Fiscal Year 2003, Table 
7 -Internal Revenue Gross Collections, by Type of Tax, Fiscal Yeas 1973-2003, 
available at http://www usgovlpublirs-soi/03dbO7co xls (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) 
95 Except in the case of transfers to a spouse who is not a United States 
citizen, the gift tax marital deduction is unlimited IRC 5 25?3(i)(1) (marital deduction 
disallowed where spouse is not n citizen of the United States) A donor may transfer up 
ro a ccrl;lrn starutory amount to 111.; 01 iler inon-citizerl sj)ouse each y:rr I-lo\v~ver, IRC 
4 ?523(i)(?j <t:rtcs ~11.11 wlrcn the spotlsr: u i  the donor is lrot a i(11ired Stat25 crtizcn fh;rt 
II(C S Z503tb) amdies to oiilc and tlic :lcdocrion :rllo\r:lble In 200.4. [hat amount was 
$114;000. kev PPoc 20011-85,2003-49 1R.B 1184. 
96. In the estate tax context, IRC $ 2001 imposes a tax on the "taxable estate" 
of every citizen or resident of the United States IRC $ 2001(a). A decedent's taxable 
estate is defined in IRC $ 2051 as his or her gross estate (as further defined in IRC $ 
2031(a)) minus certain deductions. Permissible deductions include expenses, 
indebtedness and tams under IRC $2053, losses under IRC $ 2054, charitable bequests, 
legacies, devises or transfers under IRC $2055, and most significant for purposes of this 
discussion, under IRC $ 2056, "the value of any interest in property which passes or has 
passed from the decedent to his or her surviving spouse, but only to the extent such 
interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate " IRC $ 2056(a) 
Similarly, in the gift tax context, IRC $ 2501 imposes a tax on all property 
transferred by gift during a calendar year by any individual. IRC $ 250l(a)(l) In 
essence, the gift tax is imposed on all "taxable gifts." Under IRC $ 2503(a), "taxable 
gifts'' are the total amount of gifts made during the calendax year, other than annual 
exclusion gifts made pursuant to LRC 5 2503(b), less the deductions permitted by 
subchapter C of Chapter 12 of' the Code (IRC $ 5  2522-2524) IRC $ 2503(b) The 
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between spouses is accomplished by means of a tax deduction In calculating 
the amount of total taxable gifts, a decedent's executor or a living taxpayer, as 
the case may be, may deduct all transfers to a su~viving spouse (for estate tax 
purposes) or a current spouse (for gift tax purposes), provided that certain 
requirements are met. The five requirements rue: 
(1) The gross estate of the decedent includes the property with 
respect to which the marital deduction is sought." 
(2) The recipient of the property must be a surviving spouse or 
a CurIent spouseg8 
(3) In the case of transfers at death, the property must be 
included in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes?' 
(4) The property must "pass" from the decedentltransferor to 
the surviving spouse or the current spouseto0 
(5)  The interest may not be a non-deductible terminable 
interest ' O '  
The last of these, the prohibition on non-deductible terminable interests, is the 
source of many significant estate and gift tax c o n t r o v e r ~ i e s . ~ ~ ~  
1. T11e Termi~zable I~l te~es t  Rule - In lay terms the terminable interest 
rule provides that only an outright transfer or its very near equivalent will 
qualify for the wealth transfer tax marital deduction. In technical terms a 
terminable interest is one "which will terminate or fail on the lapse of time or 
taxpayer may exclude from the calculation of his or her taxable gifts transfers that 
qualify for the annual exclusion under IRC $ 2503(b)(l). In ZOO&, the annual exclusion 
is $1 1,000 Rev Proc. 2003-55,2003119 I.R.B. 1154 The annual exclusion is indexed 
for inflation each year LRC $ 2503(b)(2). Deductions for gift tax purposes include 
transfers to or for the use of charity and transfers to a spouse. IRC $5 2522 (charity), 
2523(a) (spouse). The recipient must he the donor's spouse at the time of the gift. 
97. Willbanks, supra tiote54, at457. SeeIRC $$2056(a), 2523(a);Treas Reg. 
$$ 20 2056(a)-1, 25.2523(a)-1 Certain decedents or donors not subject to estate tax, 
See, e .g,  IRC $5 2101, 2106 (no estate tax imposed on an individual who is not a 
citizen or resident of the United States if he or she does not own property situated in the 
United States). 
98. IRC SF, 2056(a), 2523fa); Treas Reg $$ 20 2056(a)-1, 25 2523(a)-1 
Professor Willbanks describes survivorship in the estate tax context as a separate 
requirement Willbanks, supra note 54, at 457-58 
99 Willbanks, supra note 54, at 459 See also LRC $3 2056(a); Treas Reg $ 
20 2056(a)-1 
100. Willbanks, supra note 54, at 459 This rule "limits the amount of the 
marital deduction to the net value of the property received by the surviving spouse." Id 
See alsoIRC 2056(h)(4) (calculation of amount of property passing to surviving spouse 
must take into account the net property interest passing to the spouse) 
101 The double negative is statutory IRC $5  2056(b)(l), (b)(7), 2523(f)(1) 
and (f)(2). See Willbanks, supra note 54, at 464,467-68,473-92, 
102. See, eg., Priv L ~ I  Rul. 92-42-006 (Jul 15, 1992) (transfer of life estate 
in art qualifies as QTIP property) Private letter rulings are binding only on the 
requesting taxpayer and may not he relied on as precedent IRC $61 10(k)(3) 
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on the occurrence or the failure to occur of some contingency "Io3 Conversely 
a non-terminable interest is one, like outright ownership, that will not terminnte 
or fail on the lapse of time or on the occunence or the failure to occur of some 
contingency Two examples illustrate this rule. 
First assume that Husband transfers to Wife a life estate in Blackacre 
Because Wife's interest in the life estate expires upon her death, Husband's 
hansfer does not qualify for the gift tax marital d e d u ~ t i o n . ' ~ '  If Husband 
transfers Blackacre to Wife outright, however, the transfer does qualify for the 
marital deduct i~n . '~ '  Unlike a life estate, outright ownership does not expire 
upon Wife's death, insofar. as she may transfer Blackacre to designated 
beneficiaries or heirs at her death. 
A term of years is a second example o f a  terminable interest that does 
not qualify for the marital deduction. Assume that Wife transfers Greenacre to 
Husband to use and enjoy until Daughter attains the age of twenty-one or 
sooner dies. If Daughter dies before her twenty-first birthday, Greenacre will 
be transferred to Son. If Daughter survives to her twenty-first birthday, 
Greenacre will be transferred to D a ~ g h t e r . " ~  Wife's transfer of time-limited use 
and enjoyment of Greenacre to Husband does not qualify for the marital 
deduction because Husband's interest will be defeated at Daughter's twenty- 
fustbirthday or earlier death.'" 7 contrast, if Wife gives Greenacre to Husband 
outright, the transfer qualifies for the marital deduction. An outright ownership 
103. Treas Reg 5 20 2056(b)-l(b) See also IRC 5 2056(b)(1) ("Where, on 
the lapse of time, on the occunence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an 
event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate 
or fail, no deduction shall be allowed ") 
104. IRC $5 2056(b)(I), 2523(b)(l) (no deduction for interests that expire 
upon lapse of time). 
105 This assumes that Wife is a United States citizen. See IRC 5 2523(i) 
(disallowance of marital deduction in the case of transfers to a non-citizen spouse) 
106. The examples in this Part I.A. 1, illustrate two separate transfers to which 
the reciprocal hust doctrine would not apply See United Stares v. Grace's Estate, 395 
US. 316 (1969); Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F 2d 99 (2d Cis. 1940), cert. denied, 
310 U.S. 637 (1940) In Grace, the Court ruled that the value of a trust created by wife 
is includible in husband's gross estate under IRC 5 2036(a)(1) where husband and wife 
created "crossed" trusts in which "the trusts [are] interrelated, and . . . the arrangement, 
to the extent of mutual value, leaves tile settlors in aooroximatelv the same economic 
position as the) isould have bean in had they cleated th; trusts fla~riin:: tl~emselves as life 
bcncfiuiarics " 395 1J S at 32-1 In a recent ~rivate letter rulinp the Internal Revenue 
Service offered further guidance on the ci~cumstances in whiih the reciprocal trust 
doctrine will apply See Priv Ltr. Rul 2004-26-008 (June 25, 2004) (ruiinz that life 
insurance uust; ;ri;ltcd by each ot husband and wiie lo, tile othet were not i$rrelatcd 
and thelefo~e not subject to the ~eciprocal uusr doctrine). Private lettc~ rul~ngs a ~ e  
binding only on the requesting taxpayer and may not be relied on as precedent. iRC 5 
61 10(k)(3) Nevertheless, private letter rulings may provide insight into the Internal 
Revenue Service's approach to a particular issue. For further analysis of the reciprocal 
trust doctrine, see ElenaMarty-Nelson, Taxing Reciprocal Trusts, 75 N C  L. Rev 1781 
(1997): Timothv P. O'Sullivan & Stewart T .  Weaver. Usine Two Trusts With 
~ e c i ~ ; o c a l  ~~o ; sa l  Gcneinl l'o\vr~s of Appointrncni, 30 Est. plan 283 (Iunc. 2005) 
I07 lllC 66 2056tb1( I I. 2523(b)( l I (no deduction for inle~ests that termin;~te 
. . . . . . .  
upon a certain event or contingency).dther: terminable interests include annuities, 
patents and copyrights Treas. Reg $5 20 2056(b)-l(b), 25 2523(b)-l(a)(3). 
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interest does not "fail on the la se of time or on the occurIence or the failure to 
,>I"! occur of some contingency., 
While mere life estates (without a gene~al  power of appointment) and 
teIms of years, as examples, do not qual~fy for the marital deduction, one 
special form of terminable interest does qualify If property meets four specific 
conditions, it will be treated as "qualified terminable interest property"10y 
("QTIP") that is deductible for wealth transfer tax purposes. First, the property 
must pass from the transferor to the surviving spouse, in the case of 
testamentary  transfer^,"^ or  the current spouse, in the case of lifetime 
transfers."' Second, the transferor or the transferor's executor affirmatively 
must elect QTIP treatment for the transfer, or it will not qualify for the marital 
deduction and will be subject to taxation.lr2Third, the spouse must be entitled 
to all income from the transferred property, payable at least annually.lr3 Fourth, 
no person may have the power to transfer any portion of the transferred 
property to any pe~son  other than the spouse.ttJ 
108. Treas Reg $ 20.2056(b)-l(b) See also IRC 5 205G(b)(i) ("Where, on 
the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an 
event or. contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate 
or fail, no deduction shall be allowed")., 
109 IRC $$ 2056(b)(7)(A), 2523(f)(1). 
110. IRC 5 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(I). 
111 IRC 6 2523ffY2)fA). 
r 12 mc ij5 2056(b)(i)(~)(i)(no, 2523(f)(Z)(C). 
113 IRC 66 205Gfb)f7)fB)fi)lII). fii)fI). 2523ffX2)fB) The survivine snouse 
.. .. . . ,~ ,. . .. ,. . . .  ,. ,
must have the autl<dkty to demand that the trust property be made productivg ireas. 
Reg $20 2056(b)-7(h) Example 2. 
114 IRC $5 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(JI), (ii)(n), 2523(0(2)(B). A typical QTIP 
tlansfer is made by means of a trust that requires the T ~ s t e e  to pay all income at least 
annually to the spouse for life, with discretionwy ability to invade ptincipal for the 
benefit of the spouse alone. See, e.g , James S Sligar & Bridget .I. Crawford, Form 7, 
in David Westphall & George Mair, Estate Planning Law and Taxation A-61(4th ed 
7nn2\ 
.."".>,, 
The beneficiary-spouse of a QTIP trust has the right to demand that the trust 
property be made productive (or sold and reinvested in productive property). Treas 
Reg. 6 20.2056fb)-7fh) Examole 2 AIthoueh there is no case or ruling that indicates tile a .. , .  , .  - = 
rnrniniurn ;lmount of interest that trust property lnust exn to be productive, the th~eshold 
orob~blv is 2s lirtlc as 3% oer anrrum Ct T I C ~ S .  l l e ~  6 1 6-!3(1))-l (defirrition olincomc 
interestior purposes of sibparts A, B, C and D o?P"art I of~ubc'ha~ter  3 of the Code 
rrovetninrr income taxation of estates and trusts) Under this regulation. a 3% unitrust 
- b - 
plyment may uonsrit~~tean"income" inte~sst for purposzsofdetermining wheti~er at~ust 
\ r i l l  bc tre:~ted 3 b  a .'si~nnle" (flay ill1 income) or 'rom~lcx" (no tequirsmcnt to D:IV 211 
income) trust for income t a ~ ~ u ~ ~ o s e s ,  Id Such a unitrust interest'should qual<%as a 
sufficient "income" interest for purposes of the martial deduction IRC $5 2056(b)(8), 
2523(g); Treas Reg. $5 20.2056(b)-8, 25.2523(g)-1 See Jonathan G Blattmachr & 
Mitchell M Gans, The Final "Income" Regulations: Their Meaning and Importance, 
103 Tax Notes 891 (May 17,2004) 
To qualify for QTIP treatment and the marital deduction, the beneficiary- 
spouse need not have a power of appointment over the trust property If the spouse does 
have both the requisite income interest and a general power of appointment over the 
transfer~ed nrooertv. the transfer will oualifv for the marital deduction under IRC 6 
!056(b)(jj icjiarc ;ax) or IRC 5 2523iej (&;h tax) By dispositive plovisioni of tile 
~vvcri~in$ instrument, the trust's :';intot (or the testator under whose \V111 the QI'IP ttust 
In effect, the QTIP rules allow a taxpayer to obtain tax-advantaged 
treatment for transfe~s of property to his or he1 spouse, even though the 
beneficiary-spouse has a Limited interest in (and possibly no control over) the 
property. By way of illustration, assume that Husband's Will directs that his 
entire estate be held QTIP trust for the benefit of Second Wife for her life, 
remainder to pass on Wife's death to Husband's children from his marriage to 
First Wife. Husband could name Thiid Party as Trustee with sole and absolute 
discretion to pay trust principal to Second Wife. Husband also could prohibit 
Third Party from invading trust principal for Second Wife's benefit. For tax 
purposes, it is irrelevant that Third Party may be an ally of Husband's children 
from his maniage to First Wife (and hostile to Second Wife) or that Second 
Wife has no ability to control the disposition of the trust property at her death 
Second Wife's mere authority to cause the Trustee to malte the trust property 
productive means that she has a qualifying income in te re~ t"~  and Husband's 
transfer to the trust will be eligible for the marital deduction. 
2.  The Eco~zo~nic Irnpor-tnnce of the Ertate mzd Gift Tax Ma~ital  
Ded~rctiorz - Whether a person is motivated by love, affection or tax law, 
transferring assets to aspouse has positive estate tax consequences. Because the 
marital deduction allows one spouse to transfer assets to the other without 
adverse tax consequences, it is a powe~ful estate planning tool. Unless each 
spouse separately owns assets e ual to or in excess of the amount that can be 2 protected by the unified credit," the credit will be "wasted" in a tax sense In 
other words, if any taxpayer may transfer up to $X without attracting transfer 
tax, a taxpayer who does not have $X cannot use his 01 her exemption. Because 
the exemption is not transferable to another taxpayer, it will never be used 
Consider a scenario in which the applicable exc l~s ion"~  for wealtll transfer 
taxes is $1,000,000: 
Assume that A and B are married, A owns $2 million, and B 
owns nothing. If A dies first, she can leave $1 million to a trust 
is created) can control the disposition of the property upon the beneficiary-spouse's 
death without ieooardizinr! the trust's OTIP treatment 
115 kce'text ac&mpanying note 114 
116 IRC $8 2001.2010(a) The unified credit is also known as the aoolicable 
C I C ~ I I  Cndcr rlle Gconornic Gro\brlt 2nd l'nr I<elieiReconctli:ttion P\:I of ?ilfil, l'ub 
I No 107-16, 115 Star 70 (2001) (helcinafrer "I:GTKRA"j. 'ro rhe cur6rit nor uscd 
\virh iespecr lo liiettms taxable gifts, the unified ctedit :tllowcd under Section 2010 01 
the Codc nr:ty protect Sl,U00,000 ot :isset? in 2003 (iltltl yetlrs :~ircr 20101; S1,500.000 
i n  200-1 ; ~ n d  2005. 6!.000.000 i n  2006 rhtouelt 2008. and 53.500.000 in 1009 IJndcr 
EGTRRA, the fede;ai estate tax is repealed &r 2010'" ~ligar'& drawford, supra note 
114. at A-42 n l .  See also Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Lauren Y Detzel. Estate Plannine 
" 
Changes in the 2001 Tax Act - More Than You Can Count,, 95 J of Tnx'n 74 (Aug 
2001) fdtscuss~on of changes under EGTRRA): Jonathan G Blattmachr & M~tchell M 
. . 
Gans; \~ealrh 'I.i:lnsfer T.;., Repi.;ll: Some Thotight:, on Pulicy ;lnd f'ltlnniny, 90 'l.xx 
SIJICS 393 (Jm 15. 2001, (3n.llysis or esrare and gift rilr p l t~nni i ig  oppo~rui~~ties undel 
FGTRR,\\ - - - - - - .,
117 IliC 6 2010 The term "auulicable exclusion amount" refers to the amount 
that may be protected from tax (startibi with the lowest tax bracket) by reason of the 
unified credit under IRC 5 2010 See IRC 5 2010(c) 
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[that does not qualify for the marital deduction] to pay the 
income to B for life with remainder to the children This trust 
will not qualify for the marital deduction . . . . The remainder 
of the property can be left outright to B or in a trust that 
qualifies for the marital deduction. . A ends up with a taxable 
estate of $lmillion but pays no estate tax because of the 
applicable credit. 
If, however, B dies first, A ends up with a $2 million taxable 
estate . . . . This tax could have been avoided had A given B $1 
million during B's life B could then have bequeathed this $1 
million . . . . As long as the bequest via a] trust does not 
qualify for the marital deduction, it will remain in B's taxable 
estate and be sheltered from tax by the applicable credit."' 
A comparatively wealthy spouse can transfer assets to a less wealthy spouse so 
that each spouse's estate will he of sufficient size to take maximum advantage 
of all available tax deductions, exemptions, exclusions, special valuation rules, 
credits and lower tax ratesiL9 Tax-advantaged inter vivos gifts, then, forma key 
part of wise estate planning. 
B Gift-Splitting By Sponser, or "Wlzat'.~ Mirle I s  Orris" 
Married couples benefit from not only the marital deduction, but also 
from the ability to "split" gifts. Under section 2513,"' spouses may agree to 
have any gratuitous transfer by one spouse to a third party treated for gift tax 
purposes as made one-half by each spouse ' "  One-half of a taxpayer's gifts will 
be attributed to the non-donor spouse if the non-donor spouse indicates his or 
her consent on the donor's timely filed gift tax return."' Gift-splitting can 
minimize (or even eliminate) ,$it tax liability, especially when applied in 
connection with a series of annual exclusion gifts under section 2503(b).'" To 
illustrate, assume that Wife gives each of her three children a gift of $22,000 
cash. If'Husband consents to split the gifts, Wife is treated for tax purposes as 
making three gifts of $1 1,000 each and Husband is treated as making t h e e  gifts 
of $11,000 each. Because each $11,000 transfer is made under the protection 
of the annual exclusion, neither Wife nor Husband will owe any gift tax, and 
118 Stephanie I Willbanks, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: An Analysis ;md 
Critique 13.05 (3rd ed. 2004) (citations omitted). Note that at the time this example 
was written, the applicable exclusion amount was $1,000,000., 
119. See, e g , IRC 9 2010 (unified credit against estate tax) 
120. IRC 5 2513. 
121. rrCC 5 2513(a). Gift-splitting is available only with respect to transfers by 
spouses who both are citizens 01 residents of the U ~ t e d  States at the time of the transfer 
IRC S 2513Pa)fl). .. ~. " ~ ~> , ~ . ,  
122 The regulations set forth the manner and time of signifying consent Treas 
Reg. $5 25.2513-1.25 2512-2. 
123. Under IRC 5 2503(b), the fist $10,000 of gifts by a donor to any person 
in a taxable year is exempt from gift tax. For 2004, this amount has been indexed for 
inflation to $11,000. Rev Proc 2003-85,2003-49 I R B  1184 
Wife can diminishes her taxable estate, If Wife had not "split" the gifts with 
Husband, one-half of each tsansfer would have been subject to taxation. 
Gift-splitting is consistent with the treatment of a married couple as a 
single economic unit for wealth transfer tax purposes Theoretically the identity 
of the actual tsansferor is immaterial if all property held by either spouse is 
treated for wealth transfer tax purposes as belonging equally to both If' both 
spouses agree, the transferor-spouse acts for tax purposes as a quasi-agent, and 
the gratuitous transfer is treated as made one-half by each taxpayer 
As a matter of property law, an intended recipient may disclaim, 01 
refuse to take ownership of, a gratuitous transfer. In the estate administration 
context, disclaimers commonly are used for tax planning purposes. This is 
because a disclaimer that is "qualified" for federal wealth transfer tax purposes 
causes the disclaimed property to be treated as passing directly from the 
decedenddonor to the alte~nate named beneficiary or a statutory taker in 
default, as the case may be."%enerally speaking, for a disclaimer to be 
"aualified" for federal transfer tax purposes, the disclaimer must be made in 
w;itirrZ'" no linter than nine monthi atier the transfer crcaring the intcrest (or 
tliep~~rportcd t~unsfe~ee's twenty-first bilrhd~~y, ifIinter~;~'~ih~.disilaiinant mt~st 
not-accept the property or any of its benefits;"' and the interest must pass 
without any direction on the part of the di~clnimant"~ to either the decedent's 
spouse or a person other than the disclaimant himself or herself.''' If a 
disclaimer does not meet all of these criteria, then for transfer tax purposes, the 
disclaimant, not the decedenddonor, is the transferor for tax purposes.13' 
In the estate tax context, whether a disclaimer is qualified for tax 
purposes has impo~tant estate tax consequences If a testamentary gift, devise 
or bequest to an intended beneficiary ordinarily would qualify for an estate tax 
ded~ct ion, '~ '  for example, but the intended beneficiary makes a qualified 
disclaimer, the estate's anticipated tax bill may change depending on the 
identity of the person who succeeds to the property by reason of the disclaimer. 
The transfer resulting from the disclaimer may or may not he eligible for the 
124. IRC 6 2518(a\ ("For Durooses of this subtitle. if a oerson makes a 
. . .  . , 
qudified dlscl;limcr with rcspcct ro any  inrcrest in property, this subr~tlc s h ~ i l  apply with 
rssvec~ to iuc l~  inrerest ns if die intcre~r  had ire\,o~ hscn tr;rnsfcncd ro suc l~  r~criorr ") 
' 125 IRC 5 2518(b)(l)., 
126 IRC 5 2518(b)(2)(A), (B). 
127 IRC 5 2518(b)(3). 
128 Where one person makes a written transfer of his or her entire interest in 
property to a person who would have received the property had the disclaimer been 
"qualified" for federal wealth transfer tax purposes, the transfer will be treated as a 
qualified disclaimer for purposes of IRC 5 2518 IRC 5 2518(c)(.3) 
129 IRC5 2518(b)(4)(A), (B) 
130 Stephens et al., supra note 34,1[ 10 07, 
131 E.g , IRC $5 2056 (marital deduction), 2055 (chatitable deduction) 
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same tax treatment if the disclaimed amount is sizeable, the change could be 
significant "' 
Disclaimers by a surviving spouse are subject to rules that are different 
from those that apply to disclaimers by other persons A disclaimer by a spouse 
or surviving spouse that otherwise meets the requirements of a qualified 
152 To illustrate the important tax implications of the disclaimer rules, 
consider a scenario in which Father dies, leaving a Will with the following bequest: 
I give and bequeath the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) to my adult daughter, Daughter, if she survives me, or, if 
she does not survive me, or if she shall effectively disclaim all or any 
portion of this bequest, I give and bequeath all of such prope!ty, or 
the oortion so disclaimed. as the case mav be. to Charitv. if at the , . 
111111: of sucli d~spos~tion it isan or%ani~itionde>cri'oed i n  arrd nieerin~ 
tile renui!emr~nlr of IRC j S  1 7 0 1 ~ )  3~Cl ?O55(:ll 
"Charity" is uskd in this examplev& a gineric stand-in for the class of beneficiaries 
transfers to whichqualify for the estate taw charitable deduction An actual Will typically 
would contain the specific name of an organization described in and meeting the 
requirements of IRC $5 170(c) (income tax charitable deduction) and 2055(a) (estate 
t z u  charitable deduction) If, within nine months of Father's date of death, Daughter 
delivers to Father's executor an inevocable written refusal to accept the $100,000 
bequest, the property passes to Charity Note that the bequestpasses to Charity pu~suant 
to the terms of Father's Will, without direction on Daughter's part and without 
Daughter's having accepted any portion of the bequest. Assuming she has accepted no 
benefits from the offered legacy (such as interest earned by it), then for federal transfer 
tax purposes Daughter's disclaimer is "quaIXed." IRC 5 2518(a). The property is 
treated as passing directly from Father to Charity. Id.. Father's estate will be entitled to 
an estate tax charitable deduction. IRC 5 2518(a) 
If Daughter's disclaimer is not "qualified" for estate taw purposes, the tax 
conseouences to Father's estate chanee. Assume the same facts as above. but that five 
L, 
munrh; liter i3tlier's de:~th, I)augI~te! request^ and receives payment ofthe SIU0.000 
bcuucst Dauclner soends Sj.000 of the bcnucst on a luxurious vacation but t11cn decides 
she'does notwant iny of thd money. ~ s s i m e  that Daughter is independently wealthy 
Daushter then wants to disclaim the beauest, causing the monev to uass to Charjtv 
. . 
~ c f $ c  thc ninil~ munth alter Fatller's death, l)aughte;rei~nburses the estate from her 
uxn iunds ibr the entire il00.000 becluest 1)3url1ter also delivers ro Cother's csecutur 
an irrevocable written refusai to accept the be$est. Pursuant to the terrns of Fatl~er's 
Will, the executor pays $100,000 to Charity, 
As before, for estate tax purposes, the bequest passes to Charity. Yet in this 
case, Daughtei fust accepted die benefit of the bequest by spending part of it on a 
luxwious vacation and then decided to disclaim it Even though Charity ultimately 
receives $100,000, Father's estate will not be eligible for the deduction under IRC § 
2055(a) for transfers to charity. Daughter's disclaimer is not "qualified" for transfer tax 
purposes, and Daughter, not Father's estate, will be treated as the hansferor of the 
orooertv 1R.C 6 2055 
. ' .  
'l'iie 13s Ian gives Dxi:hter an opportuniiy to accept the propert). f ~ n d  l i . ~  tlle 
tax coneouence, ro Father's estate). bur once she ha; decided to accept i t .  she nlnv riur 
change h& mind (for tax purposes;'at least). Note, however, that because DangGter's 
disclaimer is not qualified for transfer tax purposes, she may be eligible for an income 
tax charitable deduction with respectto all or aportion of the bequestpassing to Charity. 
1RC 5 170(a) In any event she would not incur any gift tau on the transfer to Charity 
IRC $2522(a). 
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~ l i s c l a imer '~~  will not lose its tax-favored status if the spouse accepts or receives 
benefits from the disclaimed property. In fact many sound estate plans re1 on 1 disclaimers by a surviving spouse for post-mortem estate tax A 
testator may give his or her entire estate to the surviving spouse, but typ~cally 
provides that if the surviving spouse disclaims all or any portion of such 
property, the property so disclaimed will be held in a trust, such as a 
discretionary trust for the benefit of the testator's su~viving spouse and 
descendants that intentionally does not qualify for the marital d e d u c t i ~ n . " ~  Ln 
such a case the spouse's potential or actual benefit from the trust property does 
not render the disclaimer "unqualified" for estate tax purposes The decedent 
remains the transferor for estate tax purposesn6 and the unused unified credit'37 
applies to "cover" the transfer to the discretionary trust, resulting in a non- 
taxable estate. 
By allowing the surviving spouse to disclaim to a trust for his or her 
benefit, the tax law does not force the surviving spouse to make the all-or- 
nothing choice faced by other disclaimants. Instead the tax law treats the 
surviving spouse as an extension of the decedent himself or herself, by granting 
the surviving spouse the ability to control, to a certain extent, the estate tax 
consequences of the decedent's death, without forfeiting the benefit of the 
13.3 LRC $ 2518(b); Treas. Reg. $ 25.2518-2(a) For the requirements of a 
qualified disclaimer, see discussion supra Part I C. 
134. This is especially tIue for estates of married couples having modest 
wealth. So that neither soouse will "waste" the unified credit available under IRC 6 
2001, each spouse's Will typically provides for an ouuight bzqucsr of d ~ e  nine estarc 
to the S U I  V I \ . ~ I I U  SDOUSC At tile ~urvivor's elec~ion l i  c . uoon eifcct~ve cliscl;~in~er oiall 
or a portion 2 ihe decedent's estate), a trust that do& not qualify for the marital 
deduction is created for the benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse and descendants. 
Such a flexible estate plan allows the surviving spouse to take into account all 
circumstances at the time of the decedent's death and the nine months after death IRC $9 2031 (valuation at time of death), 2032 (alternate valuation date). If the surviving 
spouse does not anticipate needing all of the assets bequeathed outright, the surviving 
spouse wiU disclaim an amount equal to the decedent's unused applicable exclusion 
amount. Because the entire estate then qualifies for either the estate tax marital 
deduction under IRC $ 2056 or will be covered by the unified credit under IRC $ 2010, 
no estate tax should be owed upon the death of the first spouse to die See IRC $$ 2001, 
2010. 
135. A disclaimer typically funds such a trust with an amount equal to the 
testator's unused applicable exclusion amount, or the maximum amount that the testator 
can transfer without incurring an estate tax. IRC $2010 Estate planners f~equently refer 
to this type of trust as a by-pass or credit shelter trust. See, e.g., Henkel, supra note 4, 
a t B d f l d  
- - I &  
136. Ordinarily if anintendedbeneficiary acceptsadisclaimedproperty interest 
or derives any benefit from it, the disclaimer will not be "qualified" and the intended 
beneficiary, not the decedent's estate, will be treated as the property's tr'msferor of the 
disclaimedproperty for wealth transfer taxpurposes Yet where theintended beneficiary 
is the decedent's surviving spouse, if all other requirements of a qualified disclaimer are 
met, the surviving spouse's disclaimer will remain qualified for'tax purposes, even if the 
surviving spouse derives benefit from the disclaimed property. See discussion supra Part 
I C 
137 See IRC $ 2010 
784 Florida ray Review [Val 6 8 
disclaimed property In this sense, a husband and wife are treated as one tax 
planner for wealth transfer purposes 
The one flesh, one taxpayer rules are undesirable because they 
reinio~ce traditional gender roles and because they fail to recognize non- 
marital, economically unified couples The estate and gift tax rules may favor 
marriage, but they generally hurt women by invigorating antiquated 
jurisprudence that denies women legal personhood The marital deduct ion~les  
in particular prevent a less wealthy spouse (typically the wife) from achieving 
economic autonomy In disregarding the importance of many non-marital 
relationships, thelaw of wealth transfer taxation encourages dependence on the 
state This Part describes how current tax rules hurt women and explains why 
women and others should want to pay more taxes 
A. T l~e  Crirrelzt Tnx Rules Rei~zforce Traditional Gender Roles 
I. Covertrire, Legal Personhood and Taxation - The persistent appeal 
of the one flesh, one taxpayer approach to wealth transfer taxation is based in 
part on its gender neutrality and in part on its familiarity Legal unity of married 
couples is a common law tradition. Marital unity fo~med the backbone of the 
system of coverture that dominated English and American jurisprudence well 
into the nineteenth centur 13' Although the tax legislative history contains no 
reference to covertu~e,'~" many legislators would have been aware that 
treatment of a married couple as one person was not unique to tax law The 
historic context of coverture and critiques of that institution illuminate the 
problems that result from the tax law's embrace of' it. 
a. Historical Background 
F ~ o m  as early as perhaps the tenth century, amarried woman at English 
common law was a feme covert 14' Her legal identity was "covered" or 
subsumed by her husband's 14 '  A wife had no legal authority to act 
independently from her husband except in limited circumstances. As one 
nineteenth century commentatorexplained, "By maniage, the husband and wife 
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman 
is suspended du~ing the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs 
1.38. Coverture is an antiquated way to define "[tlhe condition of being a 
marlied woman." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). For a discussion ofthe role 
of coverture in the development of American law, see generally Hendrik Hartog, Man 
and Wife in America: A History (2000); Sarah Baninger Gordon, The Mormon 
Question: Polygamy and ConstitutionalConflictinNineteenth-Century America(2002)., 
139 See, e.g, S. Rep. No. 80-013 (1948). reprinted in 1948 U.SC.C.AN. 
1163; H R.  Rep. No 8.3-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U S.C.C A.N. 4017. 
140 Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women. Mar~iage, and Property 
in Nineteenth Century New York 19-23 (1982); see also Hartog, supra note 1.38, at 43. 
141 Id. 
everything.""~arriage iiaditionally caused a woman to lose her legal identity 
for at least as long as the marriage lasted 
Historian Norma Basch links the legal concept of marital unity to the 
Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Coverture, she explains, arose from the 
biblical "doctrine of the unity of the flesh."lJ3 According to the book of 
Genesis, upon marriage "a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to 
his wife, and they become one flesh "'" If marriage were a merger of spiritual 
identities,'" then it was not surprising that it resulted in a merger of legal 
identities, t o o  But covertuse went beyond mere merger In Blackstone's words, 
"husband and wife are one person in law,"'" and that person was the husband 
b. Eurly CI itiqties of Covertlire 
Nineteenth century women's rights advocates vigorously critiqued 
women's legal subordination. At a political gathering at Seneca Falls, New 
York in 1848,'" attendees adopted a "Declaration of Sentiments" that was 
draftedprincipally by Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Stanton modeled her Declaration 
on the Declaration of Independence She boldly asserted that the "history of 
mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man 
toward woman " Stanton objected strongly to women's exclusion from civic 
affairs and their inability to vote She railed against coverture for rendering a 
married woman "in the eye of the law, civilly dead In the covenant of 
marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, 
to all Intents and purposes, her master - the law giving him the power to 
142 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 430,442 
As Blackstone explains, "[A] man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into 
covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to 
covenant with her would he onlv to covenant with himself" Id 
143 Basch, supra note 140, at 22 
144 See Genesis 2:24 (RSV) New Testament writers echoed this language in 
their teachings on marriage and divorce See, e.g , Mark 10:7-10 (RSV) ("'[A] man 
shall lcave his father and mother and bejoined to Iris wife, and the two shall become one 
flesh ' So they are no longer two but one flesh What therefore God has joined together, 
let not man put asunder."). 
145 Historian HendrikHartogexplains that coverture (a legal status) and unity 
of the tlesh (n relieious status) were interrelated In his excellent discussion of men's and 
women's experiences withcovcrture, Hartog describes oneeighteenth century woman's 
philosophy of marriage "When Abigail Bailey thought of herself as a wife, she did not 
think in terms of merger, of 'one flesh,' of an obliteration of a prior self Instead, she 
thought of a seli'covered' by her husband during marriage Submission was not a denial 
of her self On the contrarv. it constituted the centIal test of her self and of the strength .. 
of her icligious identity To .4bir;lil Bailey, [covertuie] suggestud the t ~ s k  fo; a 
lifetime. a \v3v of estilbliihii~z crcdeniiills as 3 \vorihy Ch~isri;~n Coverture was h a d  but 
necessGy wdik for a distinctively female self that would realize salvation through 
submission " Hartoe. sums note 138, at 43-44 
146 Blac&to&, supra note 142, at 442 
147 The meeting at Seneca Falls typically is considered to mark the formal 
commencement of the woman suffrage movement. See, e g , Aileen Kraditor, Ideas of 
the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890-1920 1 (1965) 
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deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.""' Similarly Stanton 
claimed that in religious affairs, men "usurped the prerogative of Jehovah 
himself' by excluding women from participation in church life and religious 
governance.'" Stanton framed women's loss of legal personhood and religious 
subordination as loss of Iiberv and utter abridgement of the freedoms and 
responsibilities of ~i t izenship."~ Like the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence,'5' Stanton used emotionally charged arguments to stir her 
audience. 
c. Covertrire arzd the QTIP Ruler 
Insofar as the Internal Revenue Code is gender neutral, the one flesh, 
one taxpayer approach to marital wealth transfers resembles the nineteenth 
century construction of marriage as a spiritual "merger"15' more than coverture 
In contrast to coverture, which recognized only a husband's legal identity, the 
one flesh, one taxpayer approach advocates recognition of the marital unit itself 
as the appropriate taxable entity. F a  from a pro-women's rights theory of 
taxation, however, the one flesh, one taxpayer approach to wealth transfer 
taxation responded to destabilization in women's legal identities in the years 
following the Seneca Falls Convention. 
Between the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 and the implementation 
of thejoint income tax return in 1948, married women gained unprecedented 
legal  right^."^ Recall that lawmakers explained the 1948 tax reforms as a 
response to the possible widespread conversion by states to community 
property law system~.'~%Ithough they framed the rationale as concern for 
148 I History of Woman Suffrage, 70 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et a1 , eds , 
1881-1922, reprinted 1985) 
149 Id at 71 For further discussion of tl~e nineteenth centurv critioues of the 
relationship between women's exclusion from politics and religion, Hee ~Gzaheth B. 
Clark, Religion, Rights, and Difference in the Early Woman's Rights Movement, 3 Wis. 
Women's LJ. 29 (1987); Elizabeth B. Clark, Self-ownership and the Political Theory 
of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 21 Conn L. Rev. 905 (1989) 
150. "[Iln view of this entire disenfranchisement of one-half the people of this 
country . . in view of the unjust laws above mentioned, and because women do feel 
themselves aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights, 
we insist that they have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which 
belong to them as citizens of the United States " I History of Woman Suffrage , supra 
note 148, at 71. 
151. SeeJohnPhillipReid, ConstitutionalHistory of the AmericanRevolution: 
The Authority to Tax 271-79 (1987) 
152 See supra text accompanying note. 
153. In 1848, New YorkState became the fust state to accord significant rights 
to married women-See generally, Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 
1800-1850.71 Geo. L..J. 1359-1425 (1983); ElizabethBowles Warbasse, The Changing 
L.egal Rights of Married Women, 1800-1861 (1987) Known as the Married Women's 
Property Acts, these laws were designed to limit a husband's "right to and control of his 
wife's property which the common law gave him. The purpose of those acts was to 
protect married women against unkind, thriftless, or profligate husbands, by securing to 
them the separate and independent control of all their own properw "Coleman v Bun, 
93 N Y  17,24 (1883). 
154 See discussion infra Pan II.A. 
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administrative costs,'j5 lawmakers' likely motivation for tax reform was 
preventing further erosion of male property interests in an era of expanding 
women's rights through the Married Women's Property Acts,15"or example 
The prospect of nation-wide equal property ownership by husbands and wives 
was too far-reaching for many legislators Federal tax law therefore was used 
to limit the expansion of women's property rights. If common law resident 
husbands and wives could be construed as one for tax uumoses. then residents 
ofconunon lawjurisdictions likely would not demand cbn<ersion tocommunity 
property.'" Husbands stood to gain nothing - and lose control over one-half of 
theu property - from conversion to a comkunity property law system.'" 
At least initially the one flesh, one taxpayer rules required one spouse 
to gsant the other spouse meaningful rights over transfened property in order 
to qualify transfers for the marital ded~ction. '~'The 1981 QTIP rules, however, 
practically embraced legal suspension of the transferee spouse's property rights 
By allowing a marital deduction for property over which a spouse had little 
control, the QTP rules marked the elevation of the transferor spouse's legal 
personhood and prope~ty rights over the transferee spouse's., 
2. Wonzerz Shorild Pay More Tax - Unlike coverture, the tax rules do 
not discriminate on the basis of gender. Estate tax is imposed on "the taxable 
estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States,"'6o 
without regard to fender. Similarly, gift tax is imposed "on the transfer of 
property by gift,"" wlthout regard to the gender of the donor or recipient. Both 
men and women can avail themselves of the maritaldeduction, gift-splitting and 
special disclaimer rules. Regardless of whether a property transferor is a 
husband or a wife, the same rules apply.'62 In every sense men and women are 
treated as formal equals for wealth transfer tax purposes. 
Although the one flesh, one taxpayer approach to wealth transfer 
taxation violates no constitutional principles, those committed to gender 
equality nevertheless have reason to regard it with suspicion. The estate and gift 
tax rules constitute a quasi-coverture system in which one spouse's "right" to 
control the disposition of property trumps the other's. Although this may not 
155. See sup1.a text accompanying note 30. 
156. See, e g., Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: 
Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-19.30, 82 Geo L. J 2127 (1994) 
157 Kahng, supra note 14, at 32-36. 
158 See generally, Chused, supra note 153; Warbasse, supra note 15.3. 
159. See discussion supra Part IIA. 
160 IRC 6 2001fa) 
161 IRC i 2501(aj(1) 
162. See IRC $5 2056(b), 2523(f); Regs $5 20 2056(h)-7, 25 2523(f)-l(b) 
(definition of qualified terminable interested property) 
163 "Formal eaualitv is a n~inciole of eoual treatment: individuals who are 
alike should be tteated .alike: accdrding'to thei; actual characteristics rather than 
assumutions about them based on stereotvnes . What makes an issue one of formal 
cqualiiy is [hat the claim I S  limitcd to t r e a i i e r ~ ~  i n  relalion to anothcr, similarly s~tuated 
rndi\idual 01 grou(> and do's nor cxterlt to a demand for sorile particula~, substantive 
t1e;ltmcnt " Kxharine Barrierr el a1 . Gcnder and Lau:  Theory. Doct~inc and Equality 
11  7 (3d ed 2003) 
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constitute recognizable legal "ham," it has negative social, political and 
economic implications for women.'" The QTIP rules hurt women: 
The QTIP provisions . . . were enacted to enable men to 
control the i~ltimat? disposition of prope~ty but nonetheless the 
orovicions ouulifv OTIP trunsf~.rs for a mruital deduction The 
framers of this &wexception to the terminable interest rule 
further degraded women because they assumed that widows 
would be content with receiving only one of the indicia of 
property ownership, e g , current beneficial enjoyment, and 
would not protest against the enactment of such aprovision 
If enhanced social and legal rights for women depend on increasing women's 
financial power, women "would be better served by requiring husbands to make 
outright transfers of property to their wives By implication, through greater 
wealth, women will have greater social and political clout 167 The QTIP rules 
are a primary stumbling block in women's advancement 
In treating patial interests in trusts, for one, as equivalent to outright 
ownership, the estate and gift tax rules preclude accurate assessment of 
women's economic position 
[Tlhe QTIP rules, alongwith other estate tax provisions built 
upon the fiction of marltal unity, undermine the prospect of 
women's achieving equal status with men as wealth holders. 
. . . The idea that women are increasingly wealthy has 
permeated the popular press. The data, however, are 
misleading. They obscure the true wealth holdings of men and 
women because they are based on estate tax returns. On these 
returns, QTLP property is now included in [a widow's] estate 
and accounted for as her wealth. The effect of this decision is 
to inflate the wealth holdings of women artificially.. .Through 
the QTIP trust, the fiction has created an illusory class of 
women wealth holders.'68 
164. In an unrelated context, Professor David Cassuto suggests "that the 
inherent contingency of language renders it impossible to define harm or injury without 
acknowledging the systemic perspective from which the concepts are viewed." David 
N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms, 
28 Harv Envtl. L.. Rev 79,79 (2004). 
165. Gerzog, supra note 86, at 320 See also Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical 
and Sexist OTIP Provisions: I Just Can't Say It Ain't So, 76 N C  L Rev 1597 (1998) 
162, Gerzog, supra note 86, at 32i 
167. David Cay Johnston argues that there is a direct correlation between 
wealth and political influence: "Politicians insist[] that no one bought their vote with 
their. donation and that was true But what donations did buy, every politician 
acknowledged, was access That access meant that every senator and representative was 
listening primarily to the concerns and ideas of the super rich, of the political donor 
class." David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal: The Secret Campaign to Rig Our Tax 
System to Benefit the Super-Rich and Cheat Everybody Else 41-42 (2003) 
168 Kahng. supra note 14, at 39-40. 
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The "legal fiction" of merged marital identity portrays marriage as an 
economic partnership when, in fact, men are far more powerful financially than 
women lG9 In this sense, then, the real harm of the one flesh, one taxpayer rule 
is its obscuring effect. Women's apparent wealth diminishes the need for 
unbiased empirical investigation into men's and women's comparative financial 
and economic positions 
The tenacity of the "fiction" of marital unity is, in some sense, a legacy 
of the feminist movement itself. Beginning in the 1970's lawyers  successful^ 
challenged a wide range of laws as discriminatory on the basis of gender 
Thereafter, for a law to he non-discriminatory, it must be gender neutral on its 
face or, if not, serve "important governmental objectives" and be "substantially 
related to achievement of those  objective^."^" Because the estate and gift tax 
rules are gender neutral on their face, they seemingly do not violate any 
constitutional right. Tax statutes appear to conform to the goal of treating men 
and women equally under the law 
In at least one sense, however, criticism of the estate and gift tax 
rules17' does not go to the tax laws' legality per se. Instead it attempts to 
identify how the estate and gift tax treatment of marital wealth transfers makes 
women's economic, social and political advancement more difficult. But at the 
same time, criticism of the estate and gift tax rules makes a theoretical claim, 
too  It demands consistency in tax jurisprudence. The 1948 tax rules established 
a framework in which the estate and gift taxation of marital transfers followed 
from the economic substance of the transferee spouse'sp~ope~ty rights."3 Only 
outright ownership or its very near equivalent qualified for the marital 
deduction in 1948. The current tax system should take the same approach. 
The one flesh, one taxpayer system of wealth transfer taxation is 
pernicious because it emphasizes the marital unit over an individual's legal 
personhood. Traditionally feminist activists andscholars have criticized aspects 
of marriage and the family that tend to de-emphasize a woman's 
169 Id at 38-41. 
170 See, e g , Reed v Reed, 404 U S  71 (1971) (statutory rule for the 
appointment of an administrator of an intestate estate is invalid because of preference 
f6; males among persons otherwise equally entitled to appointment as ad6nistrator). 
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S 677 (1973) (unconstitutional to require female 
member of military is to prove dependency of her spouse in order to obtain certain 
benefits, where male member of the military is not so required) 
171 Craii? v Boren. 429 U.S 190. 197 (1976) This anoroach. commonlv . . 
referred to ar  "~ntei%ediare" scrutiny, has beer1 appl;ed to invalidate laws tli'at "ha\e the 
effect of ir~vidiouslv rcleaatino tlle entire class of fznialcs to infeliol leeal status without 
legad tu the actuaicapai;iliti& of its individual members." ~ra,1rierv:411 U S. at 687. 
See also Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979) (invalidating state statute that required 
husbands but not wives to pay alimony) 
172 See, e g  , Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom ofthe 
Fatheis, 10 Law & Ineq. 137 (1991); Gerzog, supra note 86; Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars 
and Selves: Women's Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev, 
265 (1994); Kahng, supra note 1 4  Edward 1. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A 
Fresh L.ook at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code. 40 UCL.A L Rev 98.3 (1993). 
173 See discussion supra Part Il A. 
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indi~iduality.''~ Feminists have insisted on a woman's right to retain her birth 
name after maniage,17= to be free from discrimination in employment,''6 and to 
make decisions about her own health and well-being."' The tax law may be 
gender neutral, but it submerges each spouse's individual identity in the couple 
and should be subject to great scrutiny 
Many commentators have explored the law's role in confeiring 
privilege and status. Professor Patricia Williams has desc~ibed the experiences 
she and a colleague had in searching separately for an apartment in a new 
When Peter, her white male colleague, finds an apartment for himself, 
he concluded the transaction with a handshake and a large cash deposit. In 
contrast, Williams, who is African-Ame~ican, signed a detailed written 
agreement with her new landlord: 
In my rush to show good faith and trustworthiness, I signed a 
detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease firmly 
establishing me as the ideal arm's-length transactor . . [Peter 
and I1 could not reconcile our very diffe~ent  elations to the 
tonalities of law. Peter, for exarnplk, appeared to be exu?mely 
self-conscious ot his power potsririnl (either leal or inrqistic) 
as white or male or lawyer authority figure. He seemed, 
therefore, to go to some lengths to overcome the wall that 
image might impose. . . , On the other hand, I was raised to be 
acutely conscious of the likelihood that nomatter what degree 
of professional I am, people will greet and dismiss my black 
femaleness as un~eliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angy,  
powerless, inational, and probably destitute. . . . [Tlo show 
that I can speak the language of lease is my way of enhancing 
trust of me in my business affairs.17' 
Williams explained her and Peter's different approaches to law as a function of 
experience: "On a semantic level, Peter's language of . . . informality 
sounded dangerously l i e  the language of oppression to someone like me who 
was looking for freedom through the establishment of identity. . . ."'80 The 
174 In connection with her 1855 maniage to Henly Blackwell, antislavery and 
women's rights advocate Lucy Stone insisted that "[a] wife should no more take her 
husband's name than he should hers My name is my identity and must not be lost." As 
oat  of the lareer camnaien for women's riehts. activists brought litigation in 1881 to . b L - " 
guarantee the "Tight ot'rnanied women to use their own surnlmcs wirh st;lrc and fr.ds1:11 
aeencies " Omi Moreenste~l~ 1.ei~sner.The Nn~ne of the hlniden. I ?  Wi i  \Vomen's L I 
- 
233,255 (1997) 
175 See, e g , 1 Forbush v Wallace, 341 F Supp 217 (M D Ala 1971) 
(unsuccessful litigation chalIengingrequtrement tbata married woman use her husband's 
surname on state driver's license). 
176 See, e.g ,29 U.S.C. $206(d) (1994) (Equal Pay Act of 1963); 42 U S C 
$2000e (1994) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964) 
177. See, e.g,  Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 428 US. 52 (1976) 
(invalidating Missouri law requi~ing spousal consent to abortion) 
178 Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 146-47 (1991) 
179.Id. at 147. 
180. Id at 148, 
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importance of legalities and law depend significantly on one's race and gender, 
Williams explained. '" For this reason, "stranger-stranger" (fo~mal) interactions 
rue preferable to "stsanger-chattel" (informal) ones."' As a member of an 
historically disadvantaged group, Williams intentionally invoked law and 
became subject to it. This was her way of asserting equality. 
If becoming subject to the law asserts a ~ights  claim, then the one flesh, 
one taxpayer theory disadvantages both women and men. In treating husbands 
and wives as one, the tax law diminishes the importance of each (or at least 
one) spouse's individual identity AS suggested by the apartment-hunting 
experiences of Profess01 Williams and her colleague, being free from (or 
invisible to) the law may be positive for someone with "power potential" but 
"oppression" for someone else. Women historically have not had significant 
"power potential" compared to men. Women have had fewer political rights,1Q4 
properly rights,'" employment prospects,r86 and educational ~ ~ ~ o s h ~ n ~ t i e s ~ ~ ~  
than men have had For that reason especially, women should be skeptical of 
the individual's ~elative invisibility in the wealth transfer taxation of 
marriage.'" 
Undoubtedly the suggestion that women should want more estate and 
gift taxation is counterintuitive Most taxpayers do not relish tax bills; yet 
paying taxes, in a certain sense, is foundational to the claims of citizenship and 
equality In advocatingfor woman suffrage, Elizabeth Cady Stanton highlighted 
181 See id., 
182 Id, 
183. See discussion supra Part I U A .  
184 Women were not permitted to vote in national elel'tions, for example, until 
1920 See, e g  , U.S Const amend WI 5 1 ("The right of citizeos of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex ");Minor v. Happersett, 88 U S (21 Wall ) 162 (1874) (denying women's right to vote). 
For a history of the woman suffragemovement, seegenerally Nancy F. Cott,TheGrounding 
of Modern Feminism (1987); Ellen Carol DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence 
of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (1978); Linda K Kerber, 
No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligatiorls of Citizenship (1998) 
185 See, e g ,  Hartog, supra note 138, at 161-64 (descriptionof husband's superior 
rights over marital property in 1830's). 
186 See, e g , Bradwell v The State, 83 U S  (16 Wall.,) 130 (1872) In denying 
Myra Bradwell's claim that women had a constitutional right to become lawyers, the 
Supreme Court stated, "The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which 
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman 
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband." Id at 141. 
187. Women werenot admitted to the forerunnerof theuniversityof Pennsylvania 
Law School, for example, until 1883. See, e . g ,  Bridget J. Crawford, "Daughter of Liberty 
Wedded toLaw:" Gender and L.egal EducationattheUniversity of PennsylvaniaDepartment 
of L,aw 1870-1900. 6 J. Gender Race &Just.. 131. 131-32 (2002). The school had formal 
instiucrion f u ~  alm'ast IOll )ears before the first mornnn was admitted. See Hlmpron L .  
C~r ion,  :In Hi,roric;~l Sketch ofthe L3\v Depnnment of the L'nivcr51ry uf Pennsylvanla9- I? 
(Oit 10. 18821(s~eeuf1 deli\'eri.Jar L'niversitvof Pennsvl\;miadescribinr!forrn~l insuucriun 
in law bkeinni'nzn 1790) - 
= ~~~ 
788 :it hri sentencing in 1873 ior violalingthe law by voting, Susm B Anthony 
drin:tnded t11;1l ,he be suhiect 10 lull I e z ~ l  consequences "fFl;~ilino to re1 lustice - -  
- . .  .. 
fxlrnp, eten, ru get n Ilia1 b) j u q  nut of my peers - I  ask not for leniency at your h ~ n d i  
- bur rnrl~er the f u l l  ~ igor i  uit11z 1a\v '' I1 ~lisroiy of Won13n Sul'frnge . supra note 1-18. at 
700 
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women's financial contribution to government in the form of t axes  Women are 
"propertyholders, taxpayers; yet we are denied the exe~c ise  of our right to the 
elective franchise. W e  support ourselves, and, in part, your schools, colleges, 
churches, our oor-houses . and yet we have no  vote in your councils," she Y p asserted." In Stanton's reasoning, because women were subject to the same tax 
laws as men, women have a claim of right to civic participation.1go 
1. Ur~der-Inch~sivily-The one flesh, one taxpayer app~oach  to wealth 
transfer taxation is based on the assertion that husband and wife are a "single 
economic unit,"'" but m m i e d  couples need not show actual economic unity to 
qualify property transfers for the marital deduction,"' gift-splitting,'" and 
special disclaimer r n l e ~ . ' ~ '  Marriage alone between a man and a womanlg5 
entitles these taxpayers to special tax treatment regardless of the couple's 
resources, consumption patterns, or  allocation of responsibility for financial 
management.'" Under present law taxpayers who are not married (or who 
189. I History of Woman Suffrage, supra note 148, at 595 
190. See also Jones, supra note 172, at 265-66 
191. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text 
192. See discussion supra Part E.A. 
193. See discussion supra Part D.B 
194 See discussion suora Part 1I.C. 
195. 1 U S C 5 7 (2006) I'ursu~nr to the Dciensc ot Xlilrria~c Act, Pub L Xo 
104-199. 110 Star 2-119 11996) 1helciri;lftr.r 1)OhlA) siilned bv President Clinror~ in 
1996, fo; federal law purpbses, "he  word 'marriage' means onlya legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Id. Accordingly, even if two 
same-sex taxpayers are treated as married for state law puzposes, they would not be 
considered married for federal tax purposes. See id. Several commentators have 
questioned DOMA's constitutionality. See, e g ,  Mark Strasser, The Privileges of 
National Citizenship: On Saerri, Same-Sex Couples, and theRight to Travel, 52 Rutgers 
L Rev. 553 (2000); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The Supreme Court's 
Decision in Romer v. Evans and Its Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 16 
Quinnipiac L. Rev 217 (1996); Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next 
Battlemound for Same-Sex Marriage Note. 117 Harv L.. Rev. 2684 (2004). 
~~ ~ . ,  - 
196 11 is certainly true tllnr somc maxlisd couples slructur?'tl~eir finances so 
rh~ t  all assets bear the 1abcI "ours" instcad of "mrnc" and "\ours." hut not 311 married 
couples share their assets in this fashion See supra text accompanying note 62 Even 
among those who do, the degree to which property is "ours" may vary from marriage to 
marriage and from time to time during the marriage The estate and gift tax laws' 
nresum~tion that all husbands and wives are economic units missteps theoretically in its 
>sscntiilism. In femrnlst lcgal the01 y ,  rs,entiali\m rsfers to the P ~ 6 P ~ n ~ i t Y  for scholars 
ro "focus only on u,trata11 women have in common: the11 subordination to men" 2nd lo 
ignore that "ken are never just men. . , not all men have equal access to 'male' power" 
Katharine 7 Bartlett et al., supra note 163, at 1193 Marjorie Kornhauser questions the 
extent to which husbands' and wives' beliefs about their sha~ed financial management 
matches reality. Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 80-84. 
A couple may choose to organize finances at any point on a speclium that bas 
complete resource sharing at one end and total financial separation at the other end 
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cannot marry at least for federal purp~ses) '~ '  are not eligible for transfer tax 
benefits even if they demonstrate that they function as a single economic unit., 
Consider the following scenarios: 
(a) Man and Woman live together as husband and wife 
Although they equally share all financial resources andresponsibilities, 
Man and Woman are not married. Assume that applicable state law 
would not recognize their relationship as a common law maniage 
(b) Man 1 and Man 2 live together as spouses, but their state 
and local government do not recognize domestic partnerships or same- 
sex marriage. They are not married under the laws of any other state. 
Man 1 works full-time outside the home. Man 2 is a full-time parent to 
the couple's minor child. 
(c) Sister and Sister are elderly, unmarried siblings who live 
together in order to save costs. Each has a small amount of retirement 
income, but neither is able to support herself on her individual income 
alone The Sisters live modestly and share all costs evenly. 
(d) Elderly Parent lives with Adult Child. Elderly Parent has 
no assets or income, except what Adult Child provides. Adult Child is 
Elderly Parent's sole source of financial support. 
The taxpayers in these scenarios economically resemble the married 
couple of the one flesh, one taxpayer rule. Yet none of these taxpayers may 
transfer assets tax-free to the other member of the "couple." If Man from 
example (a) above leaves all of his property to Woman, assumin that his estate 5 exceeds the minimum threshold for the imposition of estate tax,' Man's estate 
will he taxable. This couple presumably could have mar~ied, but chose not to 
do so. Man and Woman are not "one flesh" and therefore are not one taxpayer 
for present wealth transfer tax purposes. Similarly, if Man 1 from example (b) 
above leaves a large estate to Man 2 or to their minor child, Man 1's estate 
would be taxable. This couple is not m a ~ r i e d " ~  or recognized as domestic 
partners2uu by the state of their domicile. Federal tax law does not recognize 
same-sex partnerships asmarriageZu1 For the couples in examples (c) and (d) 
above, the Sisters and Elderly Parent living with Adult Child, marriage is 
Manv cou~les likelv fall somewhere in between and may varv their location on the 
" ,  
spechum a't differeit times in their relationship 
197 See 1 U.S.C ji 7 (2000). For a critical perspective on the tax laws, see 
generally Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa 
ClaraL. Rev 763 (2004) (describing the Internal Revenue Code as "another weapon for 
discrimination and oppression in society's already well-stocked arsenal "Id at 768), 
198 See supra note 116. 
199 The Massachusetts Supreme Court has invalidated the state's prohibition 
on same-sex marriage. Goodridge v Dep't. of Public Health, 798 N E2d 941, 948 
(Mass 2003) 
200 Same-sex couples may register their domestic partnership inVermont Vt 
Stat Ann. tit 15, ji 1202 (2004) 
201 See 1 U S C 9 7 (2000) 
prohibited (and likely not desired in any case)."' Any of these taxpayers' 
estates, if above a certain size,"' will be taxable at death Regardless of 
economic showine, then, wealth transfer taxation benefits inure onlv to 
- 
opposite-$ex rrr:uried couples This is unfait from a policy pe~jpectivl: because 
taupayels who economically are similarly situated are taxed differently "' 
. . 
The estate and gift iax law's encouragement and support formmiage 
comports with the state's asserted interest in marriage.'05 The present national 
debate on same-sex marriage has made commonqlace proclamations about the 
"sacred institutions of marriage and the familyn-" Apart from media-friendly 
sound bites, though, the focus on the legality of same-sex maniage has required 
proponents of traditional marriage to articulate precisely why marriage is a 
"sacred institution "'07 
One scholar summarizes the state's interests in maniage as one 01 more 
of procreation, child rearing, tradition, and interstate uniformity '08 A 
Washington Statecourt succinctly proclaimed, "[M]arriageexistsas aprotected 
legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the 
propagation of the human race."'" In a litigation to defend the State of 
Hawaii's denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple, lawye~s  for the 
State declared that, "all things being equal, it is best for a child that it be raised 
in a single home by its parents, or at least by a married male and female."'i0 In 
the view of the State's lawyers, any significant change to marriage laws, such 
as the recognition of gay marria%e, might "disrupt long-settledexpectations and 
deeply-held beliefs" of citizens.-" On the question of interstate uniformity, the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized a governmental interest in minimizing uncertainty 
surrounding the obligation of one state to recognize a marriage conducted in 
another state."' 
202 See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Re1 Law $ 5 (McKinney 2004) (prohibiting 
incestuous marriages between ancestor and descendant; siblings; uncle and niece; or 
aunt and nephew) 
203. See supra note 116.. 
204. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
205. See, e g , 8  Wigmore, Evidence $5  2332-2.341 (McNaughton rev 1961) 
(spousal privilege) 
206 142 Cong. Rec S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 9. 1996) (remarks by Senator 
Helms) 
207 Id. 
208 William C Duncan, Law and Culture: The State interests in Maniage, 2 
Ave Maria L. Rev. 153, 154 (2004). 
209. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash Ct App. 1974) (discussed 
in Duncan, supra note 208, at 154-156). 
210. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1.394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3, (Haw. Cir Ct 
Dec 3, 1996) (from defendant's memorandum). See, e.g., Brad K. Gushiken comment, 
The Fine Ldne Between L.ove and the Law: Hawaii's Attempt to Resolve the Same-Sex 
Marriage Issue, 22 U. Haw, L. Rev. 149,160 (2000)., 
21 1. Duncan, supra note 208, at 160 quoting Defendants' Brief at 30, Lewis 
v. Harris, No MER-L-15-03,2003 WL 23191114 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div . Nov. 5, 
2003) 
212. Adams v Howerton, 673F 2d 1036(9thCir 1982) (discussed in Duncan. 
supra note 208, at 161) 
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2. Herero.sexua1 Privilege - Regardless of the state interest in 
marriage,'" according tax benefits exclusively to married heterosexuals is 
unjustified and unfair. The economic rationale has limited validity if married 
taxpayers who offer no proof of economic unity receive tax benefits, but 
unmarried taxpayers who can prove economic unity never receive tax 
benefits"' The one flesh, one taxpayer theory functions not as a needs-based 
benefit, then, but as a glorification of relationships that conform to traditional 
male-female relations.-" Men and women are expected to many each other (not 
members of the same gender) and form traditional, two-parent households. The 
law of wealth transfer taxation devalues non-conforming affinity or economic 
unions such as heterosexual partners who could many but do not; same-sex 
couples who cannot many; elderly siblings who cohabitate for economy; and 
an adult child who supports an elderly parent."6 
21.3. Discussion ofthe relative strengths of these claims is beyond the scope of 
this article. For a constitutional law analysis, see, e.g , Deborall A Batts, Repeal 
DOMA. 30 Hum Rts. 2 (Sum. 2003): Brett P. Rvan. Love and Let Love: Same-Sex . . , . 
llarriaie, Pnst. Prcscnt. and Future, and the Constitutionality of DOhIA, 22 C. Ha\\ L 
Rzv 185 (70001: tvl;lrkStras.;er. DOLlA and thcTwoF:rces of I:eder;rl~sm. 32 Creiohton 
L Rev. 457 (1998); Anita Y. ~oudenberg, Note, Giving DOMA some Credit The 
Vaiidity of Applying Defense of Maniage Acts to Civil Unions Under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. 38 Val U. L. Rev. 1509 (2004). 
214 See discussion supra Part 1U.B. l 
215 Professor Carolyn Jones suggests that "stereotypical notions of family 
relationships as hierarchical" provided the basis for legal and popular opposition to the 
partnershi; theory of marriage, and, by extension, c&muni& proper& Jones, supra 
note 28, at 265-68,274-80. 
Philosopher Carole Pateman suggests that the haditional view of marriage as 
a bilateral contsact mischaracterizes the relationship: 
Freedom of contract (proper contract) demands that no account is 
taken of substantive attributes -such as sex. Ifmarriage is to be truly 
contractual, sexual difference must become irrelevant to the marriage 
conhact; "husband" and "wife" must no longer be sexually 
determined." Indeed, from the standpoint of contract, "men" and 
"women" would disappear. There can be no predetermined limits on 
contract, so none can be imposed by specifying the sex of the parties. 
In contrast, the fact of being a man or a woman is irrelevant. In a 
proper marriage contract two "individuals" would agree on whatever 
terms were advantageous to both The parties to such a contract 
would not be a "man" and a "woman" buitwo owners of prope~ty in 
their pcrrons who have come to an a]!reernenr about their property to 
- - .  - 
their mutual advantage. 
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Conuact 167 (1988). Instead, Pateman sees ma~iage as an 
instsument of a patriarchal social system in which women trade access to their bodies 
in return for physical safety and satisfaction of material needs Id at 57 
216 Feminist theorist Catharine MacKinnon suggests that law's emphasis on 
heterosexuality is a form of subordination of women 
[Sfex inequality takes the form of gendei; moving as a relation 
between people, it takes the form of sexuality Gender emerges as the 
congealed form of the sexualization of inequality between men and 
women. So long as this is socially the case, the feelings or acts or 
Two urgencies pressed by feminist jurisprudence are recognition of 
women's connectedness to others-" and support for women's traditional care- 
taking Professo~ Martha Fineman, for one, asserts that women, more 
so than men, are responsible for care-taking of children, the elderly, and the 
sick2'%he advances a theory of the "derivative dependency" of care-takers: 
"[T]hose who care fbr others are themselves dependent on resources in order 
to undertake that care. Caretakers have a need for monetary or material 
resources. They also need recourse to institutional supports and 
accommodation, a need for structural armngements that facilitate caretaking "O 
Estate and gift tax reform admittedly is not at the foref~ont of the feminist 
agenda Yet applying Fineman's tllesis revisions to the tax law would be at the 
forefront of the feminist agenda. The tax law can support and accommodate 
women's care-taking relationships by extending marital-type transfer tax 
benefits to an adult child who provides an elderly w e n t ' s  sole financial 
- . 
support 
Tax breaks for caregivers would lead to lessened economic 
dependency By way of illustrat~on, assume that Adult Child fromexample (d) 
above predeceases her Elderly Parent If Adult Child could make tax-free 
transfers at her death to Elderly Parent, Adult Child's full estate will be 
available to support Elderly Parent The mole assets that are available to 
Elderly Parent, the less likely that Elderly Parent will become a ward of the 
state Conversely, if Adult Child's estate is h l l y  taxable, less w ~ l l  be available 
to support Elderly Parent If Adult Child's estate, after payment of taxes, is 
dssircs ot parti~ula~ inJi\~itIu.~Is nu[\\ iihsti~nclii~g, ender inequality 
will diviJe [heir society I I I ~ O  tuu curritnunities of inteiesr The male 
centrallv features hier&chv of control 
Catharin;~. MailGnnon, ~eAnis&~nmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 6 (1985). 
If' gender is "sexualizedineoualitv." then lieterosexual marriage is aformalization of that 
-. . ,  
inequdir) By providing benefiis r.s:lu~ively to iietcrosexual n~artie~l takpaycrs, the 
tr~nsicr [ax s\,sremicir~fotce\ the n1euohoiic3nd liieral villusof triadifional miilc-femill~ 
relationships The tax law further entrenches marriage and therefore perpetuates 
inequality between men and women 
217 In Professor Robin West's view, 
Womenarenot essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, 
and forever seoarate from other human beings: women, distinctively, 
are quite clea;ly "connected" to another hukan life when pregnant. 
. , The potential for material connection with the other defines 
women's subjective, phenomenological and existential state, just as 
surely as the inevitability of material separation from the other 
defines men's existential state, 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender. 55 U Chi. L. Rev. I, 2, 14 (1988) West's 
"connection thesis" posits "four recurrent and critical material experiences" of women: 
pregnancy, heterosexual intercourse, menstruation and breast-feeding. Id at 2-3. 
218. Cf Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towads a Substantive 
Feminism, 1999 U Chi. Legal F. 21,22 (critical of strands offeminist theory advocating 
that women "adopt traditionally feminine attributes and repress masculine ones") 
219  Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: 
Independence, Autonomy, and SeIilSufficiency. 8 Am U 1 Gender Soc Pol'y & L  13, 
20, (1999). 
220 Id 
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inadequate for Elderly Parent's care, thenElderly Parent will need support from 
the state Elderly Parent's care may cost the state more than the tax revenue 
generated by Adult Child's estate."? Even if the cost of Elderly Parent's care 
does not exceed the estate tax revenue, the state could he in a negative fiscal 
posture depending on the administrative costs associated with the tax collectior~ 
process, 
IV. THE ONE FLESH, TWO TAXPAYER SOLUTION 
L.egislators should revise the wealth transfer tax laws to implement a 
one flesh, two taxpayer rule for marital wealth transfers "'Treating husbands 
and wives as separate taxpayers for estate and gift tax purposes will make large 
gratuitous transfers between spouses fully taxable 223 No longer will estate or 
gift tax treatment depend on the relationship between the transferor and 
transferee This proposal contemplates some adjustments to state law in order 
to minimize any new geographic inequality between spouses in common law 
and communiQ property jurisdictions 
B A $10 Million E.~ernptiorz From Wealtlz Tran.sfer Tmtiorz 
A key feature of the proposed one flesh, two taxpayet system is a 
significant increase in the amount that any taxpayer may transfer free from 
estate or gift tax.224 This exemption should be high enough so that the wealth 
transfer tax laws will apply to only a small minority of taxpayers, but low 
enough that taxpayers cannot transfer excessive wealth without paying tax. 
What constitutes "excessive wealth" necesswily is a subjective 
dete~mination."~ What one taxpayer may consider minimally necessary, another 
221 The term "state" refers here to the government generally The complex 
relationshin between wealth transfer tax revenue and oubliclv-funded sunuort for the ~-~~ . . 
<lderly is bsyond [he scope of tltis discussion Suffice to say for purposes of this xricle 
that i t  an  individual slate loses ~i~nificant tau icvenuc on ~ccou~ir of rl~e ohasc-out ofrhe 
~ ~ ~ ~~~~ G 
;tarede~rIi ra\ eledit, [hen rI1;lt stare's fur~cled programs fur the elderly could be in~pacrcd 
ncs~rivelv See ~eneiallv Blattmach~ S: Uctzel. i u ~ r a  11011: 116 idiscus~ion of the ~hase  
ouFof thlstste ;eat11 t& credit). 
222 But see generally Joseph M Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP 
Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N C L Rev 1729, 1729 (1998) 
lsueeeshne that feminist legal scholarshio on the estate and gift tax marital deduction 
has'r&led lo "come up witha plausible soiutiou" to gender bias in the Code); Lawrence 
Zelenak. Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N C L. Rev 1521, 1524 (1998) 
('Tilt iou,1 ietiuus problcm [with criiical tax ~chol:~r\hi~J i \  the fnilule to think rllrou:l~ 
the p~opused solutioi~s \villi sufficient cxc ") 
. . 
223 Even in a one flesh, two taxpayer system, one spouse could make gifts to 
the other under the protection of the annual exclusion See IRC $ 2503(h) 
224 See, e g , IRC $ 2010. 
225 William Gates, Sr and ChuckCollins believe that wealth in excess of $15 
million "has moved beyond the point of meeting its needs and aspirations of itself and 
its heirs " William H Gates, Sr & Chuck Collins, Wealth and Our Commonwealth: 
Why America Should Tax Accumulated Fortunes 17 (Beacon Press 2002) 
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may consider luxurious. In any case, a $10 million wealth transfer tax 
exemption would allow almost all taxpayers to provide very comfortably for 
themselves and their families. 
A $10 million wealth transfer tax exemption would greatly simplifL tax 
administration. With the exclusion set at $10 million, only the wealtl~iest 
taxpayers'26 will owe tax on account of gratuitous transfers made during life or 
at death. If such an exemption had been in place in 2002, the Internal Revenue 
Service would have received far fewer estate tax returns."' The Internal 
Revenue Service estimates that of the 98,359 estate tax returns filed in 2002, 
only 1.9% came from gross estates valued at $10 million or more."8 
Approximately one-third of those gross estates valued at $10 million or more 
were non-taxable.229 The other two-thirds of the estates contributed more than 
36% of the total estate tax revenue for 2002.2'0 In other words 1 9% of estates 
paid 36% of the estate taxes. 
The new one flesh, two taxpayer proposal addresses, although partially 
and incompletely, the claim by some critics that the wealth transfer tax 
penalizes success.'" These critics especially target the estate tax: "The threat 
of having a tax like [estate tax] takes away all incentive of sowing  your 
bu~iness."~'' In the critics' view the estate tax is "unfair double taxation since 
taxpayers are taxed twice -once when the money is earned and again when you 
226 See id. 
227 See Table 1, Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2002: Gross Estate by Type of 
Property, Deductions, Taxable Estate. Estate Tax and Tax Credits, by size of Gross 
Estate, IXS Statistics of Income Division, Unpublished Data (July 2004), available at 
http://www.irsgov/pub/ius-soi/OZesOlge pdf, 
The one flesh, two taxpayer rule does not contemplate any change to the tax 
rules applicable to charitable transfers. See IRC $9 170(c), 2055(c) and 2522(a) See 
also Gates 62 Collins, supra note 225, at 17, and accompanying text ("[tlhe amassing of 
great wealth, above a certain point, becomes an accumulation of social and political 
power ") 
228. See Table 1, Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2002: Gross Estate by Type of 
Prooertv. Deductions. Taxable Estate. Estate Tax and Tax Credits bv size of Gross 
~ s t i t e ,  supxa note 227 
229 Id 
230. Id. 
231. During the 2000 presidential campaign, a spokesman fat George W Bush 
said, "The death tax assaults families, it creates a disincentive for hard work and savings 
and it is fundamentally unfair and all Americans should he concerned about an unfati. 
tax that penalizes families that build a business or farm with all theil energies, efforts 
and savings" Matthew I Pinzur, Estate Tax Seldom an Issue for Most, Fla. Times- 
Union, Sept. 20,2000, at B 1 (quoting Tucker Eskew) 
232 Glenn Kessler, Estate Tax Repeal Bill Delivered; Democrats Assail GOP 
Measure as a Giveaway to the Rich, Wash. Post, Aug. 25,2000, at A4 
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[sic] die "233 The so-called "death tax"'3J represents to opponents of the estate 
tax the worst possible overreaching by the federal government 
The imposition of a tax on transfers in excess of $10 million will make 
the one flesh, two taxpayer system unacceptable to advocates of complete 
repeal of the estate tax The present proposal insists on taxation of the 
wealthiest taxpayers on philosophical grounds: 
Americans who possess great wealth have a special obligation 
to pay back a debt to society. We live in a society that has 
enabled a wide variety of people to attain wealth and comfort 
And those who accumulate great wealth - $10 million, $50 
million, $500 million, and more - are people who have 
benefitted disproportionately from the system of public 
investment that we together, as tax ayers and givers to charity, 4' have put in place in our society.- 
The one flesh, two taxpayer system embraces the notion that prog~essive'~" 
wealth hansfer tax is an appropriate price for "a society enhanced by public 
investments that have been made over the ~enturies."~~'  
C. lrzcreased Tax Revenue 
Eliminating the marital deduction and increasing the applicable 
exclusion amount to $10 million necessarily will impact federal revenue That 
impact should be determined with greater precision than is possible here It 
would appear, however, that the one flesh, two taxpayer system will increase 
tax revenue. Consider the example of a $100 million estate that qualifies for the 
full marital deduction under the existing estate tax rules 23R The entire estate of 
233. Advertisement, African American Business Leaders Call for an End to the 
Estate Tax, N.Y Times, Apr. 4. 2001, at C3 
234 The origins of the phrase "death tax" are not entirely clear: 
California congressman Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), a lead sponsor 
of repeal legislation, notes that there were many references to "death 
taxes" in professional tax journals dating back to the 1970s. 
Californians, who repealed their state inheritance tax in 1982, 
deployed the "death tax" phrase throughout the campaign. President 
Reagan first used the term in a Minnesota speech in 1982, 
Gates &Collins, supra note 225, at 57 (citations omitted) 
235. Id. at xi 
236 Progressivity in taxation generally refers to the concept that those who are 
able to pay more should. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 4-5 
(9th ed. Foundation Press 2002); Posin & Tobin, supra note 32, at ¶ 1.02 (in a 
progressive income tax system, "the higher income individual not only pays more but 
pays a higher percentage of his income in tax. The effective rate is higher on the higher 
income individual. With a progressive system, the tax system is sewing, to one degree 
or another, to redistribute the wealth."). 
237. Id. at xi. 
238. See IRC 5 2057. For simplicity purposes, this example assumes 
unrealistically that the estate is not eligible for any other exemption, deductions or 
credits 
First Decedent passes outright or in qualified form to his or her Surviving 
Spouse. Under present law no estate tax is due until Surviving Spouse's 
subsequent death. Assuming a tax rate of 55% (and absent consumption of the 
bequest from First Decedent), Surviving Spouse's estate will owe $55 million 
in estate tax at his or her subsequent death. The government may wait many 
years to receive the $55 million, depending on Surviving Spouse's age, health 
and other  factor^.'^' Furthermore if Surviving Spouse consumes any portion of 
the $100 million bequest, the government will receive far less than $55 million 
in estate tax (and conceivably nothing at all). tinder the present one flesh, one 
taxpayer system, the couple's combined wealth transfer tax liability is $55 
million. 
Under the proposed one flesh, two taxpayer system, a $100 million 
estate will generate immediate revenue and greater revenue overall. f i ~ s t  
Decedent again may transfer $10 million240 to Surviving Spouse tax-free. The 
remaining $90 million passing to Surviving Spouse will be subject to taxation 
at a rate of 55%. F i s t  Decedent's estate therefore will owe $49.5 million in 
estate tax. The net $40.5 million will pass to Surviving Spouse, giving 
Surviving Spouse a total gross estate of $50 5 million. Assume that Surviving 
Spouse does not consume any of this property. Upon Surviving Spouse's 
subsequent death, the f i s t  $10 million will pass tax-free to any designated 
beneficiaries. The remaining $40.5 million will be subject to taxation at a rate 
of 55%. Surviving Spouse's estate therefore will owe $22,275,000 in estate tax., 
Under the proposed one flesh, two taxpayer system, the couple's combined 
estate tax liability is $71,775,000. 
D Tar Sinzplicity arzd Neirtruliry 
Eliminating the favorable treatment of marital wealth transfers will 
have salutary practical and theoretical consequences Perhaps most 
significantly, the vast majority of American tax ayers will be able to make 
dispositivedecisious free from tax considerations!' In this sense, the one flesh, 
two taxpayer app~oach is more consistent with the stated goals of the marital 
deduction than the present marital deduction itself When Congress revised the 
law in 1966 to recognize for tax purposes disclaimers made by persons other 
than the surviving ~pouse,"'~ the House Ways and Means Committee lamented 
the tax law's complexity and emphasized the need to save taxpayers from their 
239 Maudie Celia Hopkins, age 89, has outlived her husband by 70 years Ms. 
Hopkins is believed to be the oldest living widow of a Confederate soldier who served 
in the United States Civil War See Melissa Nelson, Clvil War Widow Provides Link 
to History, Monterey County (Ark) Herald, June 20, 2004, at A17 Also if Surviving 
Spouse left his or her entire estate to charity, no estate tax would he due See IRC $5 
170,2055 
240 This assumes that First Decedent had used none of his or 11er unified c~edit 
during life 
241 According to the 2000 Census, the median income for nonfamily 
households in the United States was $25,705 in 1999 The mean income for the same 
year was $36.609 U.S Census Bureau, QT-P32, Income Distribution in 1999 of 
Households and Families: 2000 
242 See discussion supra Part I C 
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own mistakes.'" In 1981 the same Committee supported the QTIP rules on the 
grounds that "tax laws should be neutral and . . tax consequences should not 
control an individual's disposition of property "'"The existing estate and gift 
tax rules are neither simple nor neutral, however. If an thin they complicate 
7 9  g' the tax system'45 and now dominate estate planning - 
E. Tlzeoretical I17zplicatio1z.r 
1. Taration arzd Legal Persolzhood- On a theoretical level eliminating 
favorable treatment for marital wealth transfers affirms each spouse's legal 
personhood. The one flesh, two taxpayer system will not permit the disparity 
between tax result and property ownership that is allowed under the current 
Q T P  rules.'" All completed transfers of the exemption threshold by one 
spouse to another will be subject to taxation.'" Gift-splitting is based on an 
unproven notion that husbands and wives are a single economic unit and will 
not be allowed. The special disclaimer mles also should be eliminated because 
they will not be necessary in a system without a marital deduction. With an 
increased applicable exclusion amount of $10 million, however, most spouses 
in fact will not owe any transfer tax, even if they give away all of their 
propeay.'" There will be minimal (if any) incentive to engage in tax-strategic 
behavior. The one flesh, two taxpayer system will simplify estate planning and 
tax administration. 
Eliminating the estate and gift tax marital deduction removes a 
powerful incentive for spousal transfers. Under current law if a spouse fears 
"releasing his hand from the control of the propexty on his wife's death and the 
risk that when she dies some alien hand will be guiding het actions,"250 the 
spouse typically creates a testamentary QTIP trust that entitles the surviving 
spouse to a lifetime income interest, but little else.'" Note that with the one 
flesh, two taxpayer system's generous applicable exclusion amount, the QTIP 
trust is unnecessary. Practically speaking this means that the f r s t  spouse to die 
could leave his or her entire testamentary estate to children from a vrior 
rnmi3ge If so, the sur viving spouse \\auld haven limited legal remedy, i e, his 
or he1 state property law right to elect against the decedent's Will Whether the 
243 See discussion supra Part 1 C. 
244 H R Rep. No. 97-201, at 160 (1981). 
245. In 1950. Professor Stanley Surrey called the marital deduction rules a 
"sorry mess." Stanley S. Surrey, An Introduction to Revision of the Federal Estate and 
Gift Taxes, 38 Cal. 1.. Rev. 1, 14 (1950). 
246. See, e.g,, Lauren B. Epstein, The QTLP Trust and the Elective Share 
Trust: Are They Really Parallel?, 53 Fla. L Rev. 965 (2001); Julia B. Fisher, 
Maximizing the Tax Effectiveness of the QTLP Trust: Pre-Mortern and Post-Mortem 
Plannine Strateeies. SF17 A.1 I.-A.B.A. 349 (2000). 
-247 ~ ; e  discussion supra Part I A 1 
248 See IRC 66 2001. 2501fa)(l) 
- .. . .. . 
249 See Id., 
250. Surrey, supra note 245, at 14. 
251. See discussion supra Part I D 
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elective share is fair or adeq~ate '~ '  is open to question. but it is a question that 
should be answered by state law, not fede~al estate and gift tax law 
2.  All tux pa ye,:^ Are Created Eqrtal- In the one flesh, two tmpayer 
system, all gratuitous transfers above the exemption threshold will be subject 
to taxation, regardless of the relationship between the donor and the donee. As 
described in Part III.B.l, transfers between members of the hypothetical 
"couples" described in that section would be fully taxable in the new system 
Regardless of any showing of economic unity, a tax would be imposed if, say, 
unmarried Man makes a gift to his opposite sex partner, Woman; or if Man 1 
sets up a discretionary trust for his same-sex partner, Man 2; or if one elderly 
Sister devises property to the other Sister at death; or if Adult Child 
predeceases Elderly Parent and leaves her entire estate to Elderly Parent in 
trust.253 Whether those transfers will result in the payment of any transfer tax, 
however, will depend on the size of the transfer and whether the transferor has 
used some or all of his or her $10 million applicable exclusion amount 
The one flesh, two taxpayer system embraces the similarity among the 
manv relationshi~s that ~ e o ~ l e  form hut reiects s~ec ia l  treatment for 
dependency relationships. The iax results of a tsaisfer hybne person to another 
should not depend on the existence of a legalized sexual relationship between 
a man and a woman. Women in particul<may develop affinity relationships 
on account of their rales as care-takers, and there is no logical reason to treat 
these economic relationships any different from marriage."" These 
relationships should not he treated as "bette~" than traditional marriage but 
should not be treated any worse, either. 
Note the similarities among a married couple (as envisioned by the 
current Code) and the hypothetical taxpaying couples described in Part III.B. 1. 
All the couples arguably could demonstrate economic unity. Recall, however, 
that tax results in the new one flesh, two taxpayer system do not depend on 
either the identity of the donor and the donee or the presence or absence of an 
economic unity of interest. Although an argument could be made for the non- 
taxation of transfers to economic dependents, such an exemptionis undesirable. 
It would complicate and increase the costs of administration of the tax system. 
Furthermore a dependency exemption would necessitate a factual inqu' into 
personal relationships that would be unwelcome by many taxpayers.' The 
252. In most jurisdictions, a surviving spouse may elect against the Will to 
receive a statutory shareof the decedent'sestate. See, eg., Restatement (Third) of Prop.: 
Wills & Other Donotive Transfe~s, 5 9 1 cmt. d (200.3); Restatement (Second) of Prop, 
Donative Transvers, 5 34.1 reporter's note 15 (1992); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The 
Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. Mich. J.L., 
Reform 1 (2003). 
253. See discussion supra Part 1II.B. 
254. Id. 
255 The present Code provides for an income tax exemption amount with 
respect to each dependent of a taxpayer. IRC 5 151(c). For income tax purposes, a 
dependent is any member of a specified class over half of whose support, for the 
calendar yea in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, is received or is treated 
as received from the taxpayer IRC $ 152(a). The specified class is comprised of the 
following members: (1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either, (2) 
A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer; (3) a brother, sister, stepbrother or stepsister 
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number of dependency exemptions theoretically available to a taxpayer could 
not be limited, absent a normative judgment about appropriate family 
configu~ations. Furthermore there might be an undesired "daisy chain" effect 
if Taxpayer 1 can transfer assets tax-free to Taxpayer 2 upon a showing of 
economic dependency, and then Taxpayer 2 can transfer assets tax-free to 
Taxpayer 3 upon a showing of economic dependency, and so on Finally, a 
dependency exemption would provide a negative incentive for a taxpayer's 
spouse and child~en to become self-supporting, productive members of 
society 256 
I;. I17zpact olz Geographic Eq~qrtality 
Notwithstanding the positive revenue effect of the proposed one flesh, 
two taxpayer system, the new rules admittedly would disrupt the geographic 
equality created by the marital deductionz5 Under the proposed system, 
gratuitous transfers in excess of $10 million by acommon law ~esident husband 
or wife to his or her spouse would he subject to taxation In community 
property jurisdictions, most "transfers" between spouses would continue to be 
accomplished by operation of state law (and therefore would not be subject to 
wealth transfer taxation).25R 
In a one flesh, two taxpayer federal wealth transfer tax system, 
community property states should not be expected to change their laws so that 
wealthy residents of those states would be subject to just as much taxation as 
common law residents. Therefore any state law response to the recreated 
geopraphic ineaualitv likelv would occur in common law states Leeislato~s in 
- - .  
common law suites might Lhoose to adopt community property laws in whole 
oi in pall Comprehensive change could he administratively prohibitive, 
however, and could lead to years cf uncertainty (and litigation)-over property 
Legislators might contain the administrative costs of converting to a 
community property system by limiting its application to taxpayers who earn 
or accrue more than $10 million durine lifetime. Such a svstem mieht raise 
accounting questions, however, in the a&ence of specific, sihple and k r  rules 
to determine what assets "count" toward the $10 million limit. A third option 
would be for legislators in common law jurisdictions to enact a voluntary 
of the taxpayer, (4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either, (5) A 
steofather or stenmother of the taxoaver. (6) A son or dauehter of a brother or sister of . .  . . .  
t l~e ' tar~n~ur,  ( 7 j ~  brother ur sister of the father or mother i f  the taxpayer, (8) A soo-in- 
law, dauclhie~-in-law, father -in-law, mother-in-I;w. biothei-in-1aw.orsister-in law of the 
. - 
taxpayer, (9) or An individual [other than the taxpayer's spouse] who, for the taxable 
year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and 
is a member of the taxpayer's household. IRC 5 152(a)(l)-(9) 
256. Minimal or no expectation of financial support may motivate children of 
wealthy taxpayers to undertake full-time employment. See, e.g,, David Rockefeller, 
Memoirs 73 (Random House 2002) (self-description of the motivations of the youngest 
son of businessman and philanthropist John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and grandson of 
Standard Oil founder John D Rockefeller, for a long and productive career with The 
Chase Manhattan Bank) 
257. See discussion supra Part LI B. 
258 Id 
259 See discussion supra Par.t II and accompanying text. 
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community property system similar to Alaska's Community Property Trust 
Act.'60 Alaska law pennits spouses in any jurisdiction to elect community 
prope~ty treatment for  property transferred to a trust, provided that certain 
conditions are met."' In the absence of a special federal exemption, however, 
260 Alaska Stat $9 34.77 010 to 995 (Michie 200.3). In reality many common 
law states have de facto community property rules that provide for the equal or nearly 
equal division of marital assets upon divorce See, e g  , N.J. Stat. Ann. 9 2A: 34-23.1 
(2004); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9 3502 (2004). A court may look at a variety of factors in 
making an equitable disuibution upon dissolutionof amarriage The New Jersey statute 
provides that a court shall examine: 
a. The duration of the marriage; 
h. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties; 
c The iicome 01 prope~ty brought ro [he nlarridge by eacll pany; 
d The standard of living establ~shed during the riiariage; 
e Anv written aeIeement made bv the ~ar t ies  before or during the marriaee 
corlc&ning an anangernent of p r i pe~ ty  distribution; 
- 
f The econumic ci1curnsr3ncrs of each Dany at the time the division of 
. - 
property becomes effective; 
g. The income and earning capacity of each party, including educational 
background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence 
from the iob market, custodial responsibilities for children, and the time and 
expense necessary to acquire suffic~ienrcducarionor training tocnable the prxty 
ro become self-supportine :ir a standard of living reasonably comparable ro that 
enjoyed during dcmarriige; . 
h The contribution by each party to the education, training or earning power 
of the other; 
i. The contribution of each party to the acquisition, dissipation, preservation, 
depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as 
weU as the contribution of a party as a homemaker; 
j The tax consequences of the proposed distribution to each party; 
k The present value of the property; 
1. The need of a parent who has physical custody of a child to own or occupy 
the marital residence and to use or own the household effects; 
m The debts and liabilities of the parties; 
n The need for creation, now or in the future, of a trust fund to secure 
reasonably foreseeable medical or educational costs for a spouse or children; 
o The extent to which a party deferred achieving their career goals; and 
p Any other factors which the court may deem relevant 
N J Stat Ann $2A:34-23 1 (2004) 
261 AlaskaStat 6634 77 010to995(Michie2003) SeeeenerallvBlattmachr 
et al., Supra note 27; ~ e w m a n ,  supra note 271 Shaftel & dreer, supra n6te 27 Some 
commentators are critical of the Alaska statute, among other state laws, as responding 
too directly to federal tax law. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes 
Affect the Development of Property Law. 48 Clev St. L. Rev. 661,671 (2000); Mitchell 
M Cans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the Marital 
Deduction Stlike the Proper Balance?, 48 Emory L.J. 871,877 (1999) However, this 
criticismappears to go to the desirability- not the legality or effectiveness-of Alaska's 
elective community property law. 
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a taxpayer with over $10 million in assets could be subject to gift tax if he or 
she elects into a community property system.26? 
Ultimately if substantive state law differences cause very wealthy 
spouses in common law and community propeIty ju~isdictions to be treated 
differently, p~inciples of federalism would suggest that the appropriate remedy 
lies not with federal tax lawzb3 At worst, legislators in common law states may 
take no action in response to the federal tax changes. Geographic inequality 
would exist, but would not be widespread because the vast majority of 
taxpayers will never have, let alone transfer, $10 million '6J But the specter of 
g e o ~ a p h i c  inequality in taxation, however minimal, should be avoided if 
poss~ble. Hopefully, the implementation of a one flesh, two taxpayer federal tax 
rule would cause citizens and state lawmakers to conf~ont state property laws 
and evaluate their fairness with respect to all taxpayers., 
The one flesh, two taxpayer system implicates two ongoing political 
debates. At the same time that voters, legislators, and courts in every state 
consider the legal and moral validity of same-sex m a r ~ i a g e , ~ ~ *  national leaders 
contest the importance of estate tax r e ~ e a l . " ~  The current tax treatment of 
marital wealth transfe~s frequently diverges from the underlying economic 
substance of property transfers. Treating husband and wife - or any two 
taxpayers - as a single economic unit is inconsistent with the privileges and 
responsibilities of citizenship as they have evolved over time. The one flesh, 
two taxpayer system proposes an increase in the applicable exclusion amount 
so that any taxpayer, regardless ofmarital status, can transfer up to $10 million 
tax-free. The new mle will shrink theadministrative costs associated with estate 
and gift tax assessment and collection, overall tax revenue will increase, and the 
tax burden will he shifted more effectively to those who are most able to pay. 
Former Commissioner of the internal Revenue Service Sheldon Cohen 
famously said that "[ilf you know the position a person takes on taxes, you can 
tell their whole philosophy The tax code, once you get to know it, embodies all 
the essence of life: greed, politics, power, goodness, charity Everything's in 
262 An elective community property trust would allow wealthy taxpayers to 
secure some of the estate tax benefits of community property, most notably the double 
step-up in basis upon the death of the first spouse to die under IRC 5 1041 
263 Cf' Gans, supra note 261, at 876-83 (raisingconcerns about overemphasis 
in federal transfer tax jurisprudence on state law property rights). 
264 See supra notes 225-26, 241. 
265. Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay Marriage, 
N Y Times, Aug 4,2004, at A13. 
266 See, e g , Martin Vaughm, As Estate Tax Repeal Emerges as Pivotal 
Budget Issue, Congress Daily, Mar. 8, 2004 
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The one flesh, two taxpayer proposalis no exception Its geatesthope 
is a wealth transfer tax system that is just, simple and progressive 
267. Jeffsey H. Bisnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: 
Lawyers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 289 (1987). (quoting 
Sheldon S. Cnhen). 
268, The "fundamental tax policy objectives," according to one Treasury 
Department official, are fairness, efficiency, and simplicity. Leslie B.  Samuels, Remarks 
of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, Federal Bar 
Association Section of Taxation Report I1  (Spring 1995) Scholars traditionally 
consider Adam Smith to have articulated these goals and several related variations See 
Adam Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (E 
Cannan ed., 1937). See also Edward 3. McCaKe~y, The Holy Grail of Tax 
Simplification, 1990 Wis L.. Rev. 1267, 1.312 (1990); M. Scotland Morris, Reframing 
the Flat Tax Debate: Three Not-So-Easy Steps for Evaluating Radical Tax Reform 
Proposals, 48 Ha. L.. Rev. 159, 178 (1976). 
